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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the dissertation ofPhilipp Degens for the Doctor ofPhilosophy in 
Systems Science: Economics presented April30, 1996. 
Title: Detenninants and Impacts ofDemand-Side Management Program 
Investment ofEiectric Utilities 
From the late seventies through the early 1990's electric utilities were facing 
many different forces that caused them to invest into demand-side management programs 
(DSM). Roots of the growth ofDSM can be found in the high inflation and energy price 
shocks of the late seventies and early eighties, spiraling building costs of generation, 
safety and environmental concerns, increased costs of new capacity with possible 
exhaustion of scale economies, unexpected high elasticity in the demand for electricity, 
and public utility commissions that sought alternatives to the resulting high rate 
increases. 
This study develops and estimates four equations that look at the more aggregate 
utility level impacts ofDSM. The goal of two equations is to detennine what factors 
influence utility investments in DSM and if stock market investment in utilities is affected 
by DSM. Two additional equations are developed to determine system level impacts of 
DSM on cost of and quantity demanded of electricity. To estimate these models four 
years of annual data were collected for 81 utilities spanning 1990-1993. These utilities 
have sold over 60% of all the electricity in the US and were responsible for over 80% the 
national spending in DSM. 
The DSM investment model indicated that of the major variance in DSM 
investment is due to the utility's regulatory environment. Both an above average 
regulatory climate and least-cost planning requirements had major impacts on the level 
ofDSM investment. The cost of equity capital equation revealed that DSM expenditures 
had a positive impact on the valuation of utility's stock. Cost and quantity equations 
were estimated both individually and simultaneously. DSM expenditures seemed to have 
a negative impact on both average cost and quantity demanded. Although these 
relationships were statistically significant, the impacts were quite small. 
To summarize; the regulatory environment seems to have the strongest impact on 
the level ofDSM investment; DSM spending was associated with an increased stock 
valuation; as expected DSM investments were found to have a negative relationship with 
quantity demanded; and finally DSM investment appeared to reduce the average cost. 
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I. Introduction 
Demand-side management (DSM) can be con~ide11ed a utility maQagement 
strategy that allows a utility to more effectively use it~ plant and equipment while 
allowing more efficient energy use by a customer. T~s is accomplished through a set of 
programs and policies designed to affect a customer's consumption levels or timing oJf a 
customer's electricity demand. This contrasts with a ~uppl.y-side strategy, where 
increased electricity demand will be met by adding generation, transmissic~n, and 
distribution facilities. In changing the electric power qemand levels, DSM programs 
and policies are targeted to promote conservation, re~luce 1Waste, and increase the use 
of more efficient motors, tools, and appliances. These programs affect th€t timing of 
electricity demand by seeking to smooth fluctuations In demand, so the bt.Jik of 
electricity provided to consumers can be generated fr~lm nwre efficient b<j.se load plants 
rather than more expensive peak load plants. This sm~lothing of demand <j.lso reduces I 
excess capacity in generating plants and transmission jlnd distribution facilities required 
to meet peak demands. 
DSM includes a wide variety of policies and programs, and has nqt been 
perfectly defined. However, it can be separated into two major categmie~: load 
management and conservation (Gellings and Talukdar, 1986). Load management 
strategies shift the period in which electricity is requir~d. This does not nt;.cessarily 
reduce the volume of electricity consumed, in part, it 1nay even increase it .. It does 
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result in the more efficient use of plant and equipment, causing a reduction in the total 
cost of providing the service. Programs targeted only at conserving of existing loads do 
not move electrical demand from one time to another. Rather they remove the demand 
entirely1• 
Following the oil price shocks ofthe 1970's the conservation of energy 
resources has become an area of greater interest to the general public. Consequently, 
energy conservation has come about through government mandates2 and rational 
economic choices by consumers and producers. In the electric industry, resource 
conservation also became critically important during this time. Environmental 
regulation put many electric utilities under tighter constraints when building generation, 
transmission, and distribution facilities. The threat of further regulation, added costs 
from proposed "carbon" taxes, and internalization of the costs of other externalities 
continued to increase the financial risk in the construction of generation, transmission, 
and distribution facilities. 
The rampant inflation and changes in safety requirements for nuclear power 
plants and environmental regulations for coal-fired thermal plants during the seventies 
and early eighties also caused power plant construction costs to escalate unexpectedly. 
These rising construction costs combined with concurrent hikes in fuel costs, led to rate 
increases. Electricity demand proved to be more elastic than expected. Utility forecasts 
1 For a more detailed description ofload management and conservation programs, see 
Appendix 2. 
2 The Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978 mandate that state regulators adopt 
marginal cost pricing to encourage economic conservation. 
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of demand for electricity often proved to be overestimated, at times leading to excess 
power generation corning on line. 
Faced with the choice of rate increases caused by excess capacity, many public 
utility commissions (PUCs) denied requests for rate increases in an effort to protect 
customers from price shocks. However, rates did increase to protect the utilities from 
financial insolvency. In many cases, PUCs allowed price increases to occur in 
conjunction with automatic fuel adjustment clauses. Some construction work in 
progress (CWIP) was also allowed into the rate base, easing the utilities' cash-flow 
difficulties. The inclusion of CWIP in the rate base went against the previous regulatory 
practices of allowing "used and useful" items into the rate base. However, some PUCs 
did not allow unfinished power plants into the rate base, and continued this policy even 
after the projects were completed, deeming the investments to have been imprudently 
incurred. Thus, major capital investments, previously considered fairly risk-free, lead to 
financial instability for many electric utilities. Regardless of the methods used to reduce 
price shocks, electric utilities' operating environment changed dramatically, putting 
many companies in financial straits. 
During this time utilities also began to face increased competition. Price 
increases made alternative fuels more attractive, causing many customers to switch 
fuels. In addition, the Public Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978 (PURP A) increased 
opportunities for non-utility generators to compete with electric utilities. Facilities 
qualifying under PURP A were allowed access to the existing electric system, and 
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utilities were forced to purchase electricity generated by these non-utility generat(!)rs at 
the utilities' marginal costs. In cases where marginal costs exceeded average costs, 
these power purchases would tend to increases prices as utility prices are based o;n 
average costs. 
PURP A also created incentives for existing customers to self- or cogenerate 
electricity. Surplus power could be sold to the utility, while back-up power woult;l be 
available from the utility. This tended to either erode the customer base or to prqvide 
added leverage to larger industrial and commercial customers negotiating electri~ity 
rates. Coupled with consumer advocacy of conservation, these trends increased the 
electric utilities' interest and activities in what has become known as demand-side 
management. 
DSM programs can be utilized for a variety of strategic purposes. Conservation 
and load management programs can be used to defer investments in new plant. This 
capital minimization strategy reduces present capital costs and concomitant risks 
associated with added capacity. Such risks include insufficient demand for the new 
capacity, cost escalation due to compliance with emerging environmental standards, 
higher inflation rates that increase capital costs, or prudency reviews that prevent 
investments from being allowed into the rate base and thus earning a rate of ret~m 
because a PUC has deemed investments to have been imprudently incurred. DSM 
programs that aim at deferring capital investments typically target "peak clipping" and 
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load shifting; reducing peak demand or shifting it to off-peak periods, hence reducing 
the need for added capacity. 
DSM programs were also developed to increase revenues. This is done by 
building new, off-peak loads by offering lower rates during those periods. Revenues 
can be increased through programs that promote strategic load growth. This often 
takes the form of promoting new electro-technologies, such as electric cars or electric 
arc fhrnaces in steel mills, or by increasing the overall market penetration of certain 
appliances and equipment. Some programs use DSM to bolster sales retention and 
increases in market share. These programs are designed to entice existing customer 
loads from switching to competing fuels or offer incentives to customers that choose 
electricity as their fuel for new equipment. 
DSM programs were believed to be very flexible in their implementation and 
goals (Hirst, 1989a). Many utilities invested in these programs to counter one or more 
adverse condition encountered in the new environment. DSM programs were promoted 
by many PUCs as least-cost alternatives to new construction and therefore a way to 
keep rates low. PUCs encouraged the implementation ofDSM programs through a 
variety of incentives, such as higher rates of return or allowing DSM investments into 
the rate base. In many states PUCs did bring about least-cost planning (Mitchell, 1989, 
1992) which forced utilities to at least consider DSM as a potential resource along with 
conventional generation. Some PUCs actually decoupled electricity sales from the rate 
of return to prevent discouraging utility investments in DSM programs. 
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Currently milch of the rationale behind these strategies has either diminished in 
strength, disappeared or 1become secondary to other forces shaping the electric 
industry. The industry is I most influenced by the appearance oflow-cost, flexible 
electricity generation in ~he form of gas-fired combustion turbines, deregulation, 
competition at all c~:~stomer levels (retail wheeling), industry consolidation through 
mergers, non-utility pow:er generation, increased system interconnectivity, and 
increased wholesale interchanges. 3 This has led to an decline in utility interest in 
pursuing DSM. 
Part of this cjeclirlle in interest in DSM has also been caused by its success. In 
many cases, the mo~t cost-effective DSM investments have already been made. Many 
of these have been realized through state and federal government mandates requiring 
more efficient appli(l.nces, lighting, HV AC equipment, and motors. For example, 
product efficiency l(l.bels I were required by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975. Major home (l.ppliance energy efficiency standards were mandated through the 
National Appliance EnefiD' Conservation Act of 1987. Most ofthese standards took 
effect in 1990, with refrigerator and freezer standards coming into force in 1993. 
Further legislation, ~stablishing lighting and plumbing efficiency standards, came into 
being with the New Energy Act of 1992. This act furthered the introduction ofvarious 
3 For discussions of the issues facing the electric power industry today see Stevenson 
and Penn (1995), Hempling (1995), Berg and Tschirhart (1995), Hirsch (1991), and 
Joskow (1989). 
6 
other efficiency standarcjs, such as increased energy-efficient building codes and more 
efficient commercial ele~trical ,equipment. 
Electric utilities promoted many of these moves towards increased standards. 
EPA's "Green lights" progra~ could not have happened without electric utilities 
developing the initial mqrkets tbr these energy-efficient products. In addition, many 
utility programs led the way tdwards adoption of these new standards and other market 
transformations. Such programs geared towards market transformations include the 
Model Conservation St"ndards for new commercial and residential construction 
adopted by many states, the "Golden Carrot" energy-efficient refrigerator, and the 
increased availability of ~om pact fluorescent bulbs. With standards achieving higher 
efficiency levels the mar~inal cost of a "negawatt" 4 increases, since it is easier and 
cheaper to develop technology that increases efficiencies at the lower levels (e.g. going 
from 60 % efficiency to 70% e~fficiency) than to capture the last few remaining 
percentage points in effi~iency1(e.g. going from a 97% efficiency to 99% efficiency). 
Another factor npw impacting DSM investment is technological change. DSM 
has always been touted fj.S a flexible resource that can be acquired in piecemeal fashion 
without an extensive plarming horizon. With the future electricity demand unknown and 
base load power plant cqnstrucrtion requiring 10 to 15 years of planning, design, and 
construction before completion, DSM often proves to be a much more appealing 
investment. Further, developments in combustion turbine technology (in efficiency, 
4 A kWh of energy savin~s. 
7 
reliability, and size) have allowed thes€!S units to become base-load units (Hirsch, 
1991). The combustion turbines can b~ constructed and sited easily and be used to 
provide incremental 100 MW loads within a year or two. 5 This fact, coupled with fairly 
stable gas prices, causes DSM to compete with a technology that is also flexible. 
DSM has been pronounced de~d many tim~s. However, tactics such as the 
Association for DSM Professionals ch~nging its name to the Association of Energy 
Service Professionals in 1995, indicat€!S ofhow that the status ofDSM in the electric 
utility industry is declining. "Regulator driven" DSM is expected to disappear, while 
"customer driven" DSM is expected t<~ flourish, with utilities offering DSM as a servic;e 
for their customers.6 In this way, cust~)mers who benefit from the services pay for them, , 
explicitly, removing issues of cross-subsidization from customers not receiving the 
services. DSM is presently being repa~kaged as a;value-added service strategy that wlll 
become part of a utility's competitive strategy (Shick and Hamilton, 1996). It is also 
expected that more informational interconnectivity will allow many DSM options, suqh 
as TOU rates, smart homes, utility control of appliances etc., to become increasingly 
cost-effective to implement. 
DSM investment has risen slowly since the early eighties, rising from more thim 1 
$860 million in 1982 7 to $2.9 billion in 1993.8 More recently these expenditures, in 
comparison to new capital investments, have gone from 3% of investment in new plapt 1 
5 Electric Utility Week, February 26, 1996, pp. 1!6. 
6 Quad Report, vol. 3 no. 7, August, 1995, pp. l1and Shick and Hamilton (1996). 
7 Cogan and Williams (1983). 
8 EIA Form 861 (1993) .. 
8 
and equipment in 1990 to almost 10% of new investment in electric plant in 1993. As a 
percentage of total generation, expected savings have risen during this four-year period 
from 0.6% to 1.5%. Projected demand savings have increased from approximately 
17,000 MW in 1990 to 23,000 MW in 1993. Savings produced by these demand 
programs can be expected to reduce consumption from 2.5% (Prete, 1992) to 3% by 
the year 2000 and to 6% by the 2010 (Faruqui, Seiden, and Braithwait, 1990). By the 
turn of the century DSM programs are projected to reduce peak loads representing 
73% of new capacity (Prete, 1992). 
Even though factors thought to spur the growth of utility DSM investment have 
waned, the impacts of past and current DSM programs are still present. DSM continues 
to be a flexible resource in which investments fluctuate depending on electricity's costs 
of supply and price. Many ofthe factors which led to DSM investment may arise again. 
Inflation may reappear increasing capital costs, and energy costs will not necessarily 
remain stable over time. Industry behavior may cause regulatory pressures to increase, 
especially in the face of rising rates. A major factor driving industry restructuring are 
anticipated lower prices. With regulators seeking to provide rate payers with lower 
prices, deregulation is considered positive. However, if prices increase, it is possible 
regulation will reappear. DSM would likely follow programs, especially regulator-
driven DSM. 
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Much re&earch has been conducted that models the DSM impacts at the 
customer and end use: level.9 In many traditional electric industry models, however little 
has been done in incorporating the DSM investment impacts into the models' 
frameworks. At 11 more aggregate level, few models have been developed. None have 
been estimated tp det1ermine DSM impacts. A few studies (Keelin and Gellings, 
1986)(Faruqui, $eideh, and Braithwaite 1990)(Hirst, 1991) have been conducted on 
the national imp11cts. ':These have primarily used simulation models. None have directly 
estimated DSM impacts at the utility system level or the national levels. 
Integrating DSM investments into models at the utility system level proves 
useful because the decisions by a single economic agent can be more thoroughly 
analyzed. If a s~fficient number of utilities are analyzed, better forecasts of national 
level impacts can be made. As part of this study, four models were estimated. The first 
models DSM investments for factors influencing utility DSM investment levels. 
Aggregate DSM imp,acts at utility system levels were estimated using a pair of 
simultaneous equations that model cost of and demanded for electricity. A final model 
was estimated tp det1ermine how the market values DSM investments. This was 
accomplished by estimating a simple model for factors influencing equity capital costs, 
with DSM bein~ one of the factors. 
9 DSM program imp:acts have been studied in numerous evaluations carried out by 
individual utilities. The results of many of these evaluations have been presented in the 
proceedings of the ACEEE Summer Session, the Energy Program Evaluation 
Conference, and the1National DSM Conference. Numerous other studies have been 
sponsored by the El<~ctric Power Research Institute. 
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These models were estimated using four years of data from 81 utility holding 
companies. In 1990, these utilities sold 60.7% ofthe electricity in the United States, 
and 78.6% of the electricity sold by investor-owned utilities. That same year they 
represented 83.5% of total nationwide DSM expenditures, and 92% ofDSM 
expenditures of all investor-owned utilities. 
Analysis ofDSM investment by the investor-owned utilities indicated that 
program expenditures were heavily influenced by the regulatory environment. This 
suggested that regulatory incentives play a large role in the decision to invest in DSM. 
Least-cost planning requirements also were positively associated with DSM 
investments. The estimated model revealed a positive, but not strong, correlation 
between DSM and capacity constraints. 
DSM impacts on costs and on quantities demanded revealed a negative 
relationship. In both cases, the relationship was statistically significant. However, 
DSM's actual impact on price and quantity was insignificant. When solely examining 
energy savings, DSM investments did not appear cost-effective unless the persistence 
of that impact was assumed to last 20 or more years. As DSM investments defer capital 
investments, the cost-effectiveness ofDSM can not be measured solely by the energy 
savings. Though DSM is only associated with minute decreases in cost this must be 
seen in a positive light. Despite utility spending on DSM and the accompanying 
revenue losses, the model does not indicate that DSM investments raise costs of 
electricity, that in tum will lead to rate increases. 
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A variety of factors may have led to these low impacts. Government energy-
efficiency legislation and program spillover10 may have increased the efticiency of 
customers, even though the utilities serving them had 1\0t invested heavily in DSM. 
Further, many DSM programs are load management pmgrams that shift consumption, 
and possibly even causing an overall increase in energy used~ 11 Other programs are 
geared towards strategic load growth or load retention. Even if a new or retained load 
is energy-efficient, the net result remains an increase ill elect:ricity consumption. 
Impacts ofDSM investments on capital costs were r)ot only positive and 
statistically significant, but had a fairly large impact Ol\ the v:alue ofthe utility's stock. 
This large impact on market valuation may be due to the DSM variable acting as a 
prox-y for other variables. Possibly, utilities investing ip DS~,v1 are considered more 
innovative and customer services oriented. As the market puts a premium on DSM 
investment during regulation, this favorable valuation ofDSM may remain as the 
industry restructures. 
This study indicates that the substantial financial in\(estments in DSM make it 
possible to measure the DSM impacts at system level~. The; study also indicates that 
10 Spillover can appear in a variety of guises. For example ¢ustomers who obtain 
program-sponsored appliances move to another utility's service territory. One utility's 
advertisements affect an adjacent utility's customers' purcl
1
asing habits. Energy-
efficiency practices cultivated by a commercial or ind.ustria;l customer are transferred to 
another site. 
11 Energy storage equipment uses more kWh at lower off-peak rates to store heat or 
cold. 
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even though much ofDSM investment appears to be influenced heavily by regulation, 
DSM services may continue to flourish following industry deregulation. 
l3 
ll. Literature Review 
For ~orne time, a great many detailed studies have been available on the impacts 
and cost-ef:lbctiveness of individual DSM programs. A fairly large industry has 
developed t<~ plan and implement evaluations of specific programs. The detail and 
breadth of many of these evaluations arose largely due to PUC's basing shareholder 
incentives op the1 measured impacts of these programs (Fels and Keating, 1993). With 
industry restructlllring on the horizon, this area of research has declined. An obvious 
sign ofthis ~hift was the cessation of the industry newsletter, Evaluation Exchange, in 
1995. 
DSM evaluation was primarily done on the program level, while less research 
was concerned with the system-level DSM impacts. Some studies have been carried out 
on individual nation-wide programs, such as the Residential Conservation Service 
(Clinton et ~I. 1986) and the Low-Income Weatherization Service (Brown et at, 1993). 
Early studie~; on overall DSM impacts collected DSM expenditure and savings data 
using surveys of!Utilities. In 1982, estimated DSM spending in 1982 was $860 million 
for 120 surveyed utilities (Cogan and Williams, 1983). As these data represented DSM 
spending for the majority of the largest private and public power producers in the 
country, the figur:es in the above sum should be fairly close to the total. Expenditures 
were expect~d to' yield construction cost savings of two dollars for every dollar spent 
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on I;:> SM. An updated study for 1985 and found little, if any increase in DSM spending 
(Cagan and Williams, 1985). 
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has funded numerous studies on 
all facets ofDSM. EPRI sponsored the first study of overall DSM impacts on the 
ele~tricity industry in 1986 (Keelin and Gellings, 1986), which was followed by a more 
COQ1prehensive update in 1990 (Faruqui, Seiden and Braithwait, 1990). Both studies 
for~cast national. DSM impacts. The earlier study primarily used engineering estimates 
to project national impacts. The second study was more comprehensive, and 
incprporated real world results ofDSM programs and end use simulation models to 
project DSM impacts. Another EPRI study (Blevins and Miller, 1993) only provided 
estimated savings and expenditures for the utilities surveyed. In many cases, the utilities 
did not report either savings or expenditures. On average, the surveyed utilities 
reported annual1funding levels of$730 million from 1991 to 1993. Trends within DSM 
sp€1nding indicate a shifting of funds from conservation to load management programs 
(Prete et al, 1992). 
A more comprehensive estimate of total DSM impacts has been available from 
ther Energy Information Agency (EIA), which has collected total utility DSM 
expenditure andl savings data from all public and private electric utilities since 1990. 
Aocording to this data, total industry DSM expenditures have grown from around $1.2 
billion in 1990 to $2.9 billion in 1993 (Table 1). This is approximately 3% of new plant 
investment in 1990, and has grown to about 10% of new plant investment in 1993. As a 
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percentage of total expenditures, DSM spending doubled during this time period, 
growing from just under 0.9% in 1990 to 1.9% in 1993. Expected savings during thi~ 
time period more than doubled, going from 17 million MWh in 1990 to over 41 milli~m 
MWh in 1993. Demand savings increased from around 17,000 :MW in 1990 to 23,000 
:MW in 1993. Reductions in peak load were larger than those of savings because many 
of the programs were geared towards peak clipping (Prete et al, 1992). 
Table D.l 
EIA Reported and Projected DSM Expenditures and Savings for all Utilities 
1990 1991 1992 1993 2000 
DSM (millions) $1,201 $1,750 $2,396 $2,888 $3,394 
MWh Savings 17,060 23,432 30,029 41,007 78,444 
(thousands) 
Savings as% of total 0.6% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 2.5% 
Generated 
Number ofUtilities 379 458 1,008 1,143 NA 
DSM investments ar~ expected to reduce total electricity demand, over that 
required in their absence. The reduction in total national electricity consumption wa~ 
projected to be 1.1% in 1990, 3% in 2000, and 6% in 2010 (Faruqui, Seiden, and 
Braithwait 1990). Another study (Hirst, 1991) projected even greater impacts ifDSM 
programs were implemented more aggressively. EIA future forecasts have estimate~ 
16 
that DSM programs will result in peak load reductions representing 73% of new 
capacity. 
ll.l. Demand-Side Management Investment 
DSM expenditures remain quite variable. Some utilities do not have DSM 
programs while others spend as much as 8% of their total annual expenditures on 
DSM. No single simple reason explains why utilities invest in DSM. For the electric 
utility industry, DSM program objectives "are shaped by a utility's reserve margin, fuel 
mix, expected demand growth, regulatory climate and other exogenous factors" 
(Cogan and Williams, 1987). 
The reasons for DSM program investments can be separated into two main 
groupings: programs embarked upon to achieve profits and those that utilities 
undertake to fulfill governmental legislation or PUC regulations. In the case of 
government legislation the reason for DSM investment is quite straightforward. 
Utilities have had to implement DSM programs that were mandated by the federal and 
state governments. One of the largest nationwide DSM programs, the "Residential 
Conservation Service (RCS)," was brought about by the National Energy Conservation 
and Policy Act of 1978. It lasted until 1989. This legislation required utilities to offer 
home energy audits at little cost to residential customers. During a single 3 year period 
of the program's existence, over 3 million audits were performed nationwide at the cost 
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of$360 million (Clint<m et:al, 1986). PURPA nudged many utilities into accepting 
innovative rates and s9me states have indirectly created DSM programs by mandating 
least-cost planning. L~ast-cost planning incorporates both supply-side and demand-side 
alternatives to meet projec1ted demand. Thus, utilities affected by these regulation, must 
consider DSM programs in their resource acquisition planning process. If deemed cost-
effective under the le<j.st-cost plan, DSM programs may be implemented. Furthermore, 
PUCs have been known to order additional DSM program expenditures (Canine, 
1990). 
Unmandated PSM investments undertaken for a profit motive can be separated 
into five categories: 
1. Addition of rever1ues.1 
2. Prevention ofrevenue: losses. 
3. Risk reductions. 
4. Public relations. 
5. PUC profit incen,tives. 
Revenues ca11 be :increased through a variety of programs including innovative 
rates that promote new, <Pff-peak consumption, marginal cost pricing such as TOU 
rates, or growth in aeneral consumption, such as declining block rates can be structured 
to promote additionfll salies. These rates correspond with microeconomic theories of 
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monopoly behavior, and are explained in the rubric of second- and third-degree price 
discrimination (Mansfield, 1970), (Scherer, 1970). The success ofthese programs on 
increasing revenues depends on the customer classes involved and their respective 
elasticity of demand. To succeed in increasing revenues, the new rates have to be 
mandatory or they must attract sales that would not have occurred otherwise. Price 
rebates during off-peak periods or times of excess reserve capacity have to be targeted 
toward new sales if the utility seeks to realize an increase in revenues. 
Programs that sponsor strategic load growth can also be seen as profitable. 
Many of these programs prevent fuel switching, thus retaining market shares. In 
addition, as yet unserved markets are developed through new electro-technologies such 
as electric cars, or electric arc furnaces in steel production. Strategic load growth 
programs can increase the market penetration of certain electric equipment, such as 
programs promoting the installation of air conditioning equipment. Energy-efficient 
space heating equipment programs for utilities with a summer peak load or increasing 
the penetration of space cooling equipment for winter peaking utilities can take 
advantage of excess system capacity and be profitable. The long-run aspects of these 
programs are also a consideration, as installation ofthe equipment will provide the 
utility a steady revenue stream over the lifetime of the equipment. 
Sales losses can occur either through the customer bypassing the utility's 
electric system or through entirely leaving the service area. Bypass can take the fonn of 
self-generation or cogeneration, fuel switching, or non-utility installation of energy 
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conservation measures. This is predominantly a problem for a utility when, large 
electricity purchasers threaten to do any of the above, because a large revenue Joss will 
increase costs for customers remaining in the system (Hyman, 1986). Under th~ threat 
of system bypass, DSM programs or lower rates may be offered to customers t.o 
decrease their electric power costs and retain them in the system. As long as the cost of 
DSM programs or lowered rates remain above service costs, the utility and other rate 
payers benefit because revenue losses and rate increases will not be as great as they 
would have been had the large customer been allowed to bypass the system. The higher 
elasticity of demand of many larger customers causing lower rates or conserva~ion 
programs, results in the DSM programs being a form of third-degree price 
discrimination. 
Whereas utility bypass was once seen as a threat primarily coming from larger 
customers (Plummer, 1990), it may soon be possible to associate this risk with all 
customer classes. Retail wheeling is a very possible reality (Stevenson and Penn, 1995). 
This will allow competition at all customer levels, while electricity services are offered 
from a variety of suppliers. Such competition will place high-cost utilities under 
pressure. To survive they may have to incur severe financial losses by writing off high-
cost generation. Bundling DSM with electric services is seen as a method of refllaining 
competitive at higher prices as DSM services adds value that justifies higher prjces. 
The risk reduction for capital investments is another reason for investments in 
DSM. Although this a profit motive, this occurs because of failures in the coun~ry's the 
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regulatory system. During the 1980's, the growth of demand has often failed to keep in 
step with industry projections. Often electric plant was built for demand that did not 
materialize. This caused reserve capacity margins to grow in many utilities, resulting in 
higher fixed costs for thelelectricity sold. To meet these higher fixed cost, utilities filed 
for rate increases. Often these rate increases were politically unpalatable, due to their 
size and denied by PUCs.' At the same time, many PUCs did not allow the added 
capacity into the rate base through a new process of prudency hearings. This caused 
many utilities: to change tlheir capital investment procedures (Hirsch, 1991 ). Such 
prudence reviews have led to smaller construction projects with less costs uncertainties 
(Lyon, 1991). To meet fulture demand growth, DSM programs were favored, as they 
promoted peak clipping, load shifting, and conservation. Lower cost DSM investments 
would be made instead ot'building new power plants requiring long lead times that 
were based on dubious prredictions offuture demand and had a high risk of having all or 
part of the project's capital expenditures lost due to prudency hearings. 
Another risk assoeiated with power plant construction are the environmental 
externalities that are assodated with production, transmission, and distribution. The 
electric utility industry erriits one-third of the nation's C02, the majority of its S02, and 
one-third ofits NOx. (Hiri:;t, 1991). With the Clean Air Act of 1969 and the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1970 began an era of environmental control programs in 
the United States that forced utilities to incorporate environmental costs into their 
system planning processes. New Source Performance Standards were periodically 
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updated using the "best available control technology," that allowed emissions to be 
reduced over time. These policies, combined with additional regulations on water 
pollution and solid waste controls, caused environmental control systems to account for 
one-fourth to one-third ofthe total costs ofnew coal-fired power plants (Rubin, 1989). 
Further, increases in electricity generation costs can be expected as more stringent 
emission standards are enacted. Several state governments and PUCs have already 
started to incorporate the costs of these externalities in rate hearings (Cohen et al, 
1990). Evidence has been found that older capacity is used more intensely (Stanton, 
1993), that indicates that the industry is postponing the use and construction of new 
capacity. To comply with the new standards, ifthey are passed, will put new and even 
existing generation at risk of higher costs. 
The potential health risks of electromagnetic fields around transmission lines are 
also facing higher scrutiny. Possible negative impacts raise the specter of increased 
transmission costs. This, together with other environmental regulations, should make 
DSM investments more attractive as they defer the construction of new generation and 
transmission and distribution systems (Hirst, 1991 ). 
The reductions of capital and environmental risks are an important facets of 
DSM that now have competition from supply-side alternatives. Developments in 
combustion turbine technology and world-wide competition have allowed the prices of 
gas-fired combined-cycle plants to decrease 30% to 40% over the last 4 years. 12 Cost 
12 Electric Utility Week Feb. 26, 1996 pp. 11. 
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savings have notably occurr~d in construction times where the building schedules for 
such plants have fallen to ei~hteen months. New advancements in coal-fired power 
plants have also reduced risj(s associated with these plants. Developments in coal 
gasification and fluidized bed technologies have also reduced these plants' installed 
costs by 15% to 20% within the same 4 year period. For this coal fired technology 
construction times have als9 been cut by half, to about three years. Technological 
improvements have decreased the viable sizes of these coal plants. These shorter lead 
times and the ability for sm11ller increments in capacity to be installed have reduced the 
magnitude of capital risks. ln addition, 1using gas-fired or newer coal burning 
technologies has reduced the environmental risks for these generating plants. 
DSM investments are also a fonn of public relations. DSM programs that are 
pursued for such reasons oflen promote conservation and efficient energy by use of 
advertising, energy audits, ~emonstration projects, or small scale retrofit and measure 
installation programs. Som~ programs~ such as low-income weatherization have a dual 
purpose of promoting com1nunity goodwill for the utility and while decreasing the 
number of unpaid bills. Th(t-se prograrri1s are usually relatively inexpensive and their 
reductions in electricity demand arc quite small. With the arrival of competition brought 
about by industry restructuring, DSM :programs can also be seen as a way to promote 
and differentiate one utility from othe(· energy providers. This can enhance the utility's 
competitiveness (Flynn, 1992). 
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Since utility profits are regulated by the PUCs, regulatory incentives and 
disincentives can impact a utility's decision to invest in specific inputs. At the moment, 
many DSM proponents hold the view that "each kWh a utility sells, no matter how 
much it costs to produce or how little it sells for, adds to earnings" while "each kWh 
saved or replaced with an energy-efficiency measure, no matter how little the efficiency 
measure costs, reduces utility profits" (Moskowitz, 1989). This is certainly true for 
pure conservation programs that only reduce existing loads, thereby reducing utility 
revenues. Unless the lost revenue is recouped through a rate increase, there are no 
incentives for conservation investment. In certain states, attempts have been made to 
change the incentive to produce electricity rather than conserve electricity. California's 
Electric Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (ERAM), the state of Washington's larger 
rate of return on DSM investments, and other DSM incentive plans that have been 
developed in New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania indicate PUCs trying to 
foster investments into DSM programs. Greater acceptance levels can occur with the 
recovery ofDSM program costs, adjustments for the associated revenue losses, and 
increases in rates of return in these investments countering perceived risks involved 
with DSM investments (Reid and Chamberlain, 1990). 
With expected increases in competition, most ofthe regulatory efforts are 
suspended. Once competition begins, "customer-driven" DSM services may be all that 
will remain of previous DSM programs. Once the customers are able to change energy 
service providers, it will no longer be cost-effective for utilities to invest in DSM 
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seiVices that have long-term pay-backs. Capacity and energy savings derived from a 
customer receiving these services will be shifted if the customer moves to a new 
electricity service provider. 
DSM Investments occur for reasons that are dependent on a plethora of utility 
characteristics, regulatory environments, and characteristics of customers seJVed. 
Utility investments in production inputs have been modeled by using the framework of 
a profit maximization model (Averech and Johnson, 1962), (Baumol and Klevorick, 
1970). Other models ofutility investments in supply-side resources, such as 
transmission and generation facilities, were developed by Baughman, Joskow, and 
Kamat ( 1979). Here the inputs are explained by the characteristics of the firm and its 
customer base. These models provide an appropriate framework for understanding the 
DSM investment levels and the factors driving them. These models incorporate a 
variety of utility characteristics, such as total sales, sales by customer class, total 
number of customers by customer class, and service area. A model of this type will 
provide information on what type of utility characteristics are likely to influence the 
level ofDSM investment. 
D.2. Cost of Equity Capital 
Various models for capital costs have been developed over time. These include 
separate models for the cost of debt capital (Berndt, 1979), (Archer, 1981 ), (Dubin and 
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Navarro, 1982), (Prager, 1989) and the cost of equity capital (Trout, 1979), (Archer, 
1981), (Pubin and Niavarro 1982), (Gapenski, 1989), (Fanara and Gorman, 1986). For 
the mos~ part, these models have been developed to determine if and how regulation 
impacts ~lectric utilitiies' capital costs. 
The cost of eiluity models use the market-to-book (M/B) ratio as a dependent 
variable. This ratio quantifies the relationship between the price that a utility's common 
stock conunands on the market and the book value of its assets. Financial and 
managerial factors found to have a strong positive relationship with the MIB ratio 
include the actual rate~ of return, the expected rate of return, and the dividend pay-out 
ratio (Dt1bin and Nav1arro, 1982 ). A negative relationship to the MIB ratio was 
connecte:d to debt financing and nuclear power plant construction (Gapenski, 1989). 
The cost of debt capiltal has been found to have a negative relationship with the 
percenta~e oftotal costs paid in taxes and for fuel (Dubin and Navarro). Prager (1989) 
showed ~hat a large variety of utility characteristics can play an important role in 
determining the cost of capital. 
ll.3. Ele~tricity Demand and Price 
I1npacts on electricity demand and price have been studied extensively over the 
years. El~ctricity demand is actually driven by the services it offers, such as light, heat, 
or powering motors. '1Therefore, it is a derived demand and is associated with a capital 
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good, such as a light bulb, electric appliance, or motor that provides the desired 
service. Electricity consumption can be modeled using the following equation: 
Quantity= f(R,A) 
where A is the vector of the stocks of electricity using equipment and R is the vector of 
the utilization rates of each type of equipment. Lacking exact data on equipment stocks 
one can create a reduced form equation: 
Quantity = f(P. ,P 8 , Y, Z) 
where quantity is a function ofP c, the price of electricity, P 8, the price of competing 
fuels, income, Y, and the vector of other variables, Z. Unless the supply of electricity is 
perfectly elastic, the identification problem (Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991) arises. The 
identification problem "is essentially one of inferring characteristics of demand alone 
from market data that reflect the combined influences ofboth supply and demand 
behavior'' (Bohi, 1984). To deal with this problem a cost function can be modeled 
separately with the equation: 
Cost= f(Quantity,P1,P,,Pk, W) 
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where the cost of electricity is d~termined by the quantity demanded, the vector of fuel 
prices Pr, the price oflabor Pt. the cost of capital Pk, and a '~vector of other factors W. 
These two equations can b~ linked with a linear constr11int: : 
Pe *Quantity = Cl)st +1 Return on Investmen,t 
Using this constraint, the c;ost Cl!nd demand models caq be €~stimated simultaneously. 
Bohi (1984) identi~'ies a number of other issue~ inv¢>lved in developing of 
energy demand models: the aggregation level, measurement issues, functional fonn, 
and estimation techniques. Giv~n the detailed data av~ilabl~e on electricity production 
and consumption, numero).ls Stj.ldies have been perfoi111ed ;lt different levels of 
aggregation. Bohi (1981) has a,rgued that aggregatin~ derr
1
tand at the utility level is 
inappropriate, as the basis for demand would differ greatly between commercial, 
industrial, and residential ~ustqmers. Residential custpme11s are motivated by utility 
maximization, while indu~trialland commercial custorners iare assumed to maximize 
profits or minimize costs. Beginning with the classic 11rticl1e by Houthakker ( 1951 ), 
most studies model electricity :demand for specific ra~e cla'fsses, consumers, or finns. 
Bohi has shown that models operating at detailed levels of aggregation perfonn better 
than those at greater levels of:aggregation (Bohi, 19~ 1 ). 1 
Developments in demand's functional fonn have e;>ccurred over a long period of 
time. Linear or log-linear fom1ats were specified in tne ea,rlier models of demand. This 
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changed in the seventies with the advent ofthe translog model (Jorgenson, 1986) 
(Griffin, 1992). The translog model offers a more flexible functional form which does 
not restrict the models' elasticities. However, translog estimations are static and thus 
are unable to capture the temporal properties of demand. Translog model estimation 
also generates a large number of parameters. To effectively estimate the model only a 
small number of explanatory variables can be included, which places restrictive 
assumptions on the model. 
Measurement issues are also of interest. Electricity consumption is influenced 
by variables such as income, area of home, appliance stocks, etc., that should be 
included in the model. Frequently, these variables are correlated with each other, 
making it difficult to estimate their separate influences. An issue continuously discussed 
is the choice for the price variable (Taylor, 1977). If the marginal price is considered to 
be the most appropriate, rate schedules that include items such as block pricing, fixed 
charges, demand charges, and seasonal and time-of-use rates make its calculation quite 
difficult. When customers are aggregated over multiple rate schedules, the 
determination of the marginal price becomes even more complex. The relative merits of 
including the marginal price are still not established (Taylor, 1977) and one study (Shin, 
1985) indicates that customers respond to average cost. 
Electricity demand and supply studies have been repeatedly enumerated and 
described in reviews by Taylor (1975), Cowing (1978), Hartman (1979), Bohi (1981, 
1984), Jorgenson (1986), Berndt (1991), and Griffin (1992). A few ofthese studies 
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simultaneously estimate price and demand (Halvorsen, 1977, 1978) (Chern, 1978). 
Using the marginal price instead of the average price is one of the methods employe~! to 1 
remove the simultaneity (Berndt, 1991). Estimating the marginal price accurately when 
aggregating over rate classes, utilities, or over a span of time when seasonal and TOU 
rates are present proves quite problematic. With larger customers where demand 
charges apply, actual marginal prices depend on energy prices and demand charges. 
Interruptible service rates are even more difficult to model. 
State, regional, and national level models comprised most of the early demand 
studies. This has changed as more micro-level data have become available allowing 
studies to focus on industry, firm, and household level data. Hourly demand and 
demand of specific end uses have also been researched. The leap from regional to 
micro-level studies has largely avoided the demand at the utility level. One ofthe few 
published studies performed at this level was undertaken by Lyman (1978). 
The elasticities estimated through these models have varied significantly. Short-
run residential price elasticities have ranged from -0.03 to -0.54, while long-run 
elasticities have overlapped slightly, ranging from -0.45 to -2.2 (Bohi, 1981, 1984). 
Estimated income elasticities have ranged across more unrealistic levels: -0.32 to 2.0 in 
the short-run and 0.12 to 2.2 in the long-run. Commercial and industrial studies hav~ 
estimated similar ranges for short and long-run price elasticities. With income 
elasticities, commercial short-run elasticities have ranged from 0.1 to 0.72 while lon!?-
run elasticities have naturally been higher, ranging from 0.8 to 1.32. Industrial studies 
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have shown output elasticities ranging from 0.08 to 0.87 in the short-run to 0.51 to 
0.73 in the long-run. The ranges ofthese estimates are quite great and vary by 
estimation technique, aggregation level, and data quality. It is possible the elasticities 
are changing over time as tastes change, the electro-technologies grow, and inter-fuel 
competition increases. 
DSM investments have been repeatedly studied within a demand model 
framework. Numerous billing, load shape, and end use metering studies have been 
performed at many utilities. Early studies of program impacts began in the seventies 
(Berry et al, 1981 ). These and later studies have typically been specified as: 
Quantity =k (DSM, Price, Customer, Weather) 
where the quantity of electricity (hourly, daily, monthly, etc.) is a function of customer 
characteristics, electricity price, weather, and DSM investment. In earlier studies (Hirst 
et al, 1982), (Hirst, White, and Goeltz, 1984),the DSM variable used in the estimation 
was represented by a dummy variable for participation. Eventually, studies used 
expected savings (Train, 1985) or measure costs (Horowitz and Degens, 1987) to 
replace the dummy variable, thus allowing the estimation of, respectively, the 
realization rate of expected savings and the marginal cost of energy savings. Evaluation 
methods became more and more refined, and methods used came to depend on the type 
31 
of m(~asures installed, level of' savings, and type of participating customers 
(Sonlllenblick and Eto, 1995). 
The cost of electricity has been repeatedly studied at the firm and plant level. 
Typically, the cost function is estimated by itself and not simultaneously with demand. 
The reasoning behind this is that in a regulated market the output price is set by the 
regulatory authority. Therefore, the quantity demanded is exogenous to the cost. With 
output a function of the regulated price, the output level no longer is under the utility's 
control. With output fixed, cost minimization becomes a profit maximizing firm's 
objec:tive from the viewpoint of a regulated utility (Jorgenson, 1986). Most recent 
electric industry studies specify the cost function as a translog cost function. An early 
artide by Christensen and Greene (1976) that used the translog cost function to 
examined the economies of scale in the electric industry. Other studies have researched 
the effects offuel adjustment clauses (Gollop and Karlson, 1978) and the cost 
implkations ofvertical integration (Henderson, 1986). These models assumed the 
utilities in the sample were fairly homogenous, and that most of the variance in cost is 
explained by input prices. The nature of the translog cost function may have precluded 
more explanatory variables from being included in these models. If more explanatory 
varialbles were included, the number of parameter estimates would grow exponentially, 
maki111g the model more difficult to estimate. 
Simpler price models have been estimated for the electric industry. These do 
not use the translog functional form and could also be used to model costs. Halvorsen 
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(1975) estimated a log-linear model of electricity's marginal price as part of a 
simultaneous model. In a later study by Chern (1978), aggregate industrial prices and 
demand were estimated in a pooled model for 15 industries. A study by Primeaux and 
Mann (1986) estimated a set of linear price equations that represented the different rate 
schedules of the three main customer classes. The research was done primarily to 
determine if the regulator selection process impacted rates. A one-equation linear 
model ofprice at the utility level was estimated by Tolley and Bodmer (1990). This 
model, though simple, explained much of the variance in rates (R2 =0.64), and indicated 
that a variety ofutility characteristics and regulatory environments influenced the 
average price. Berndt, Doane, and Epstein (1995) effectively expanded this study, 
showing again that many factors associated with state and local government regulation 
have large impacts on the average electricity price. 
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ill. Methodology 
ID.l. Investments in DSM 
Many studies have been written about the research on various facets ofDSM. 
However, a model has not yet been developed to explain DSM investments. Given the 
substantial investments made in DSM and the variety of reasons for these investments it 
is of general interest to develop such an investment model. This is especially true with 
the advent of industry restructuring and ensuing competition. IfDSM investments 
respond to customer demand, demand will remain despite deregulated competition. If 
DSM expenditures are partially associated with specific utility characteristics present in 
a competitive environment, again it is probable that some DSM investments will 
continue after competition comes about. However, ifDSM is mainly associated with 
the industry's regulatory climate, deregulation may cause a decrease in utility-funded 
DSM programs. 
Simple models explaining investment levels in infrastructure, operations and 
maintenance expenses have been estimated by Joskow, Baughman, and Kamat (1978). 
These models can easily be used as a framework to explain DSM investments. They 
incorporate a set offinanciallmanagerial, operating, and customer characteristic 
variables. Given that many DSM programs are mandated by regulators, a DSM 
34 
investment model should also incorporate regulatory variables. The general 
specification of such a model would be: 
DSM =!(Financial, Managerial, Operating, Customer, Re,gulatory) 
DSM expenditures can be expected to be caused by a large variety of variables. 
The prices and costs of electricity is expected to play a large role in determining iDSM 
investment levels and should be positively associated with DSM investment for tiWO 
main reasons. First, high electricity costs will translate to higher rates, therefore 1 
resulting in greater pressure for lower rates from interest groups. Second, higher costs 
will also increase the number of cost-effective DSM opportunities <~vailable to a ,utility. 
The cost of installing new capacity also influences DSM sp<tnding. The actual 
pcrc0iv.;d cost of new capacity cannot be observed as it consists of' more than tHe 
installed cost. Rather, it is interconnected with the capital and asso~iated environmental 
risks. A variety of potential proxy variables exist for the need of new capacity and the 
concomitant costs and risks thereof. Large levels ofCWIP as a percentage ofthe total 
electric plant, load factor or changes in the load factor, changes in peak load, or 
changes in capacity can indicate a need for new capacity investmeqts. Also, a low load 
factor indicates the utility has excess capacity and would be less li~ely to invest in DSM 
that would reduce total amounts of electricity sold. Wholesale power sales might be a 
suitable proxy for excess capacity. Available capacity, especially a~: peak periods, can 
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spur an utility to market power produced from its remaining idle cap1~city to other 
utilities. 
The source of electricity may also impact the DSM investmel)t levels. DSM 
activity probably will be positively correlated with power purchases <j.nd hydroel,ectric 
power generation. Electricity purchased from other companies is not an energy source 
that will expand the rate base, and the utility cannot obtain capital re~:urns from it It is 
assumed the utility will strive to replace this type of energy through ~)SM programs, 
for which it may earn monetary incentives. 13 Utilities with a greater share of 
hydroelectric power generation can be expected to have large DSM ~nvestments. 
Hydropower is a low-cost source of electricity with little potential for expansion. 
Additions to generating capacity produce higher-cost electricity. Expanding capacity 
would subject the consumers of hydropower dependent utilities to much larger relative 
rate increases than customers of utilities that already use more expeqsive power:. This 
potential consumer suffering would increase the pressure on PUCs t9 find an 
alternative to building additional capacity. 
Nuclear energy sources can also be positively correlated to OSM investments as 
DSM marketing could increase a utility's image as a steward of the e.nvironment 
Difficulties that utilities have encountered with nuclear reactors hav~ created the need 
to find and invest in non-nuclear energy sources. The age of a utility's capital stock can 
13 Certain conditions may make purchasing power more desirable th"'on DSM 
investments. Utilities that are not allowed to earn a return on the DSM investment, are 
not allowed to recoup lost revenues, or have new power plants co~ng into service in 
the near future may be more inclined to purchase power. 
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also be positively correlated, because the older the stock, the greater the probability 
that aging plants will be phased out and newe1r, more expensive ones phased in. To 
reduce the investment in newer, more expensive plants, utilities should be willing to 
invest in DSM programs. A combined electric and a gas utility would be expected to be 
associated with higher DSM investment levds. A dual-fuel monopoly would allow the 
electric utility to remain impartial to fuel switching as a form ofDSM. Fuel switching 
would not be associated with net lost revenues as sacrificed kWh sales would mean 
increased gas sales. 
Weather can lead utilities in areas wiith extreme weather conditions to favor 
DSM. Extreme weather conditions bringing about higher summer or winter peaks and a 
consequent rise in excess capacity, increase u1tilities' incentive to undertake DSM 
investments. DSM programs in these seasonaX!y peaking utilities could garner 
additional savings as individual customer loads among residential customers would be 
fairly large, allowing cost-effective installation of energy saving measures. 
The density of a utility's service territory could play a role in DSM investments, 
though there are plausible reasons to assume that the relationship could be positive or 
negative. A lower density could cause many DSM options to be uneconomical due to 
the greater costs of providing services to a c;ustomer base that is further apart, thus 
reducing overall DSM investment levels. On the other hand, DSM programs could 
reduce the need for adding to transmission and distribution systems which could be 
quite costly in a service territory with greater
1
population density. Greater industrial 
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sales are expected to have a negative impact on DSM spending as industrial customers 
have been known to lobby against DSM, claiming they are subsidizing it and therefore 
paying higher th~n necessary prices (Clarkson, 1992). 
Residential customer characteristics may also influence the DSM investment 
level.s. Many utilities offer DSM programs to low-income customers. Greater numbers 
oflow income customers may increase the level ofDSM spending. On the other hand, 
low..,income consumers lack access to the credit necessary to finance energy efficiency 
mea~ures and have been found to have higher discount rates (Howarth and Anderson, 
199i3). Lower irllcomes therefore may reduce DSM program participation and spending 
if programs req!Uire participants to finance some portion ofthe energy efficiency 
service. Residential customer appliance stocks should also play a role in demand for 
DSM. Greater appliance stocks should increase the potential savings available to the 
average customer. As potential savings increase so will the demand for DSM services 
tha~ will target 1these savings. 
A utility's regulatory climate remains an important factor in determining 
inv~stment. A J;lUC may have ordered the DSM investment in the first place. A variety 
of i.nvestment and research firms evaluate and rank regulatory agencies. These rankings 
in the past have been typically based on six criteria (Dubin and Navarro, 1982): 
1. Allowed ra.te ofretum. 
2. Average regulatory lag and use of interim rates. 
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3. Whether a historical or future test year is used. 
4. IfCWIP is allowed in the rate base, or if AFUDC14 is allowed. 
5. If tax credits and accelerated depreciation are "flowed through" or "normalized." 
6. The presence of an automatic fuel adjustment clause. 
It is hypothesized that the less favorable a utility's environment ranks the more a utility 
will invest in DSM. For a greater investment in DSM allows investments in more 
expensive generation alternatives to be delayed until a return on such capital investment 
will be more profitable. Further, a utility may consider such investments as a way to 
placate a PUC's least-cost planning demands with the hope of being granted a greater 
rate of return. 
The presence ofleast-cost planning requirements and more stringent 
environmental standards are further variables that come under the rubric of a regulatory 
environment. State regulations pertaining to emissions and waste disposal, often higher 
than the federal standards, positively impact DSM programs as the costs of additional 
and existing generating capacity rise relative to DSM alternatives. However, some 
stricter state standards, such as building codes and appliance energy use standards, can 
make many DSM programs redundant or eliminate their cost-effectiveness. 
14 Allowance for funds used during construction. 
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ID.2. Impact ofDSM: Cost ofEquity <1apital 
As a corporate strateg,r, DSM investment is not rewarded by increases or 
decreases in price or demand, but in the value ofthe company's stock. Testing the 
market's acceptance ofDSM programs as this kind of corporate strategy is of great 
interest with the advent ofindj.Jstry restructuring. lfthe market does not value DSM 
during regulation, a decline in utility offered DSM services can be expected after 
deregulation. 
The cost of equity capital or utility's stock price have been studied through 
numerous models that can easily be adapted to observe impacts ofDSM expenditures. 
The simple models estimated l1y Trout (1979) and Dubin and Navarro (1982) can be 
reestimated with a term for D$M investment included. The adjusted model can be 
specified as: 
Market-to-Book Rate= g (DSM, Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
where the market-to-book rat~ is the dependent variable. The market-to-book (M!B) 
ratio quantifies the relationship between the utilities' common stock price and the book 
value of the assets. Variables CJ.SSociated with a strong positive relationship to the MIB 
ratio are: the actual rate of ret1-1rn, the expected rate of return, and the dividend pay-out 
ratio (Dubin and Navarro, 1982). Negative relationships have been detected in utilities 
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with high levels of debt, taxes, or fuel costs, or those constructing nuclear power 
plants. 
Earlier studies found a negative relationship between the regulatory 
environment and the cost of capital. In the case ofthe MIB ratio, an improved 
regulatory environment increased. the MIB rate and, in the case of debt capital, a 
favorable regulatory environment was associated with a reduction in the rated bond 
yield. The only study (Gapenslci, 1989) to analyze data from the 1980s found the 
regulatory environment to have little or no impact on equity capital costs. The 
regulatory environment has typically been entered into the models as a dummy variable 
or as a qualitative ranking. 
Circumstances have changed within the electric utility industry since these 
studies have been performed. DSM programs and investments have become a multi-
billion dollar industry and non-utility generation investment has exceeded that of 
utilities. Further, the arrival of retail wheeling has almost become a reality. With these 
changed circumstances, it cannot be expected that variables determining the cost of 
capital will remain fixed. 
How DSM investments will affect stock values is unknown. It is possible that 
the market will view them as a successful strategy that minimizes capital expenditures 
while effectively retaining existing market shares and increasing sales to growing 
markets. On the other hand, DSM programs may be viewed as a losing strategy that 
wastes utility funds and results in revenue losses that will result in lower stock values. 
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Finally, DSM expenditures may be so small and unimportant that impacts on stock 
values will be negligible. 
Additional variables that may have an impact on the stock values are those 
associated with increased capital investments, such as CWIP or the age of plant. CWIP 
was expected to have a negative relationship with the M/B ratio. The greater the 
amount of this presently unproductive expenditure, the less the market will value the 
utility. New construction is associated with capital investment risks, given factors such 
as new environmental rules, inflation, and lack of demand. In addition with industry 
restructuring, some new construction will become "stranded investments," no longer 
entitled to be included in the rate base where they can earn a rate of return. Plant age is 
expected to increase the utility's stock price since greater age will indicate less money 
invested in more expensive new capacity and possibly more efficient use of existing 
capacity. 
Another variable that will be entered into the model is the cost of debt capital. 
A higher interest rate on short or long-term debt should be associated with higher stock 
prices as borrowing costs will be higher. The plant age, load factors, changes in peak 
loads, prices of electricity, and mak~up of customers are also important variables that 
should be considered when developing the model. The age of plant should have a 
positive effect as investments in additional plant are being kept low. Average annual 
load factor should be associated with a higher stock price because more efficient use of 
existing plant should be associated with higher actual returns on investment and 
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earnings per share, thus increasing stock prices. However, very high load factors may 
indicate that insufficient generation is available to meet customer demand and will 
require new construction that, in turn, could be associated with lower stock prices. 
Increases in peak load will eventually lead to additional capacity or long-term 
purchases being required. Again, capital expenditures on new plant is expected to 
reduce the MIB ratio. For utilities with a low load factor this growth in peak load make 
use of excess capacity. Increases in peak load may be associated with overall load 
growth (peak and off-peak) that in turn may improve the load factor of the utility with 
a positive impact on stock prices. The price of electricity is becoming an important 
factor on the eve of deregulation. It is expected that utilities with lower prices will have 
lower costs and, therefore, will be able to compete successfully when retail wheeling 
becomes a reality. These utilities will have their stocks bid upward in anticipation of 
competition. Distributions of customers should impact stock prices as each class has 
different costs associated with the services it requires. The share of industrial sales 
should have a positive impact as they are less expensive to serve and have higher, 
steadier loads. However, competition may change this. Larger customers with larger 
loads will have more to gain from switching suppliers for even marginal changes in 
price. In most scenarios for restructuring the industry, industrial customers first benefit 
from retail wheeling, while the commercial and residential classes remain captive 
markets for electric utilities. 
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DSM expenditures will also enter into the model. DSM does not have a 
predicted sign. A negative sign would indicate that DSM investment depresses the 
utility's stock value, while a positive sign would indicate the market puts a positive 
value on DSM investments. 
ll.3. Impact of DSM: Demand for Electricity 
The factors influencing electricity demand have been studied comprehensively 
since the fifties. Economists have found the greatest interest in the short-run and long-
run, price and income elasticities and cross-price elasticities of competing fuels. This 
focus is understandable given that this information is necessary in planning electric 
plant and equipment investments. With the development ofDSM programs, another 
factor was introduced influencing electricity demand. Much energy demand modeling 
work has been incorporated into the evaluation ofDSM programs. However, these 
studies are primarily involved with studying specific program impacts and use micro-
level data disaggregated to the customer level or even to equipment levels. Aggregate 
models ofDSM impacts have not yet been estimated. Detailed aggregated simulation 
models have been used to estimate DSM impacts (Keelin and Gellings, 1986), (Faruqui, 
Seiden, and Braithwait, 1990), but actual estimation has not yet been done at a more 
aggregate level. 
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DSM expenditures in 1993 were close to 10% of new electric plant 
investments. DSM spending has increased from 1990 through 1993, rising from under 
1% to 1.5% oftotal expenditures for investor-owned utilities. At some utilities, DSM 
represents over 8% of total annual expenditures. In California, DSM was expected to 
satisfy 60% of the state's growth in electricity requirements for the nineties (Prete, 
1992). The overall cost ofthese programs is substantial and is expected to achieve 
moderate growth levels, despite the oncoming industry restructuring. Therefore, it is 
timely to look at the more aggregate impacts ofDSM on demand. 
A simple model ofDSM's affect on electricity demand can be estimated at 
utility levels. The general specification of the model would be: 
Quantity = k (DSM, Price, Fuel, Customer, Weather) 
This is the same general model used in countless DSM evaluations. The only difference 
lies in the level of aggregation. DSM evaluations use customer or end use level data, 
while the proposed model can be estimated at the system level. The DSM variable that 
utilities consistently report is the level ofDSM spending. There is no expected sign for 
DSM investment. This is due to differing impacts ofload management and 
conservation. In theory, a predominance of conservation in DSM investments will 
cause the estimated coefficient to be negative. If load management programs comprise 
the main type ofDSM investment and are structured to shift loads to off-peak periods, 
the coefficient should be positive. 
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The level of aggregation to the utility level was partially detennined by, as with 
most studies, the availability of data. Since 1989 the Energy Information Agency has 
collected data on utility expenditures on DSM. The data for the years 1990 through 
1993 has been published and is presently available thus allowing for one consistent 
source of reported DSM data. Four years ofDSM expenditure data were therefore 
available for all investor and publicly owned electric utilities15 . 
The expected price elasticity will be negative, ranging from -0.45 to -2.0, which 
approximate the values found in previous residential, commercial, and industrial 
electricity demand studies. The estimated price elasticity will represent a weighted 
average price elasticity as demand of all customer classes is aggregated to represent 
utility system level demand. Aggregating to the system level does not allow the 
marginal price to be estimated for the average customer, thus the average price is used. 
Even with disaggregation to the customer class level, it is doubtful that a meaningful 
marginal price estimate could be estimated. Since the beginning ofthe 1980s, the rate 
structures of many utilities have become more complex. A variety of rates have been 
negotiated for commercial and industrial clients. These new rates vary from customer 
to customer, depending on their ability to switch fuels or become cogenerators, their 
levels of peak demand, or even their financial stability. Utility rates also vary widely in 
15 Even though utility expenditures are reported from a consistent source, expenditures 
may not be completely comparable. Companies just beginning DSM programs may 
have all oftheir expenditures in planning and administration costs without actual 
investments in programs .. Reported DSM expenditures should be viewed more as an 
index of past and present DSM investments. 
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the residential and commercial sectors, where they may change seasonally, be flat, have 
increasing or decreasing block rate structures or have fixed charges. 
Positive cross-price elasticities should be expected given the variety of 
competing fuels. As the price ofthese fuels rises, customers are expected to increase 
their electricity demand by partially substituting electricity for now more expensive, 
competing fuels. Due to supply constraints placed on gas, many electricity customers 
may prefer gas but cannot obtain the service. Consequently gas' cross-price elasticity 
will be biased downwards. 
Income elasticities have been estimated in many previous studies, but, when 
aggregation takes place over customer classes the results are not be comparable. 
Nonetheless, the estimated income elasticity is expected to be positive and within the 
range of those estimated by previous models. This ranges from 0.2 to 2.2 (Bohi, 1931, 
1984), (Taylor, 1975). 
Electricity demand will naturally be dependent on the population levels and 
commercial and industrial activity levels in the utility's service territory. The number of 
residential accounts should provide a good estimate of populations and should have a 
positive sign. The number of commercial and industrial accounts, however, may not 
prove a good proxy for energy consumption because in many cases only a few accounts 
will be responsible for most of the electricity consumption. Thus, employment in these 
two sectors will be used as a measure of the sector's activity, with an expected positive 
relationship to electricity demand. General industrial employment may prove to be an 
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inexact measure of industrial demand for electricity due to the differing levels of 
intensity of electricity use and substitutability for electri~ity in industrial processes. 
Industrial employment may provide a more exact meas4re in certain SIC groups that 
use electricity more intensively than others. 
Climate extremes sho1:1ld increase energy demand duie to increased heating or 
cooling loads within buildings of all customer classes. Given greater levels of electric 
space heating, a greater consumption of electricity is to be expected. Appliance stocks 
may also vary because many states now have more strir1gent appliance and building 
codes than those of the federal government. These more striingent codes will affect 
appliance and building stocks, resulting in less electricity consumption for states where 
they apply. 
ill.3. Impact of DSM: Cost of Electricity 
There is also interest in estimating the DSM's i1npac:ts on the production of 
electricity, or specifically on its cost. The proposed co&t eql[lation will be a simple, one-
equation model similar to those used to estimate price of electricity used by Halvorsen 
(1975), Tolley and Bodmer (1990), and Berndt, Doan~, and Epstein (1995). 16 This 
equation takes the following form: 
16 This specification was used rather than a neoclassical trar~slog cost specification that 
is typically seen in electric utility cost studies. A large 11umber of factors, other than 
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Cost= j (DSM, Quantity Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
where the dependent variable cost, is the average cost of producing one kWh. This is a 
relatively simple model that can incorporate many of the variables affecting the cost of 
electricity. Quantity is expected to decrease average costs due to economies of scale. 
The DSM' s variables expected parameter is anticipated to be negative. A negative 
correlation is expected because the entire point of investing in DSM is to r~duce the 
cost of electricity. DSM was not promoted as a method of saving electricity at any 
cost, but was intended as a least-cost alternative. Utilities are investing in DSM to 
prevent having to invest in more expensive capacity expansion. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that DSM increases costs if non-cost-effective investments are made. Also, 
DSM programs that primarily target conservation may, in the short-run, increase costs 
as conservation results in immediate revenue losses. In the long-run, conservation 
defers investments in electric plant resulting in lower costs. In the short-run, quantities 
sold are reduced, resulting is higher costs. 
input prices, were expected to influence DSM impacts on costs. A translog model 
specification that includes numerous non-price variables will tend to have an 
extraordinary number of coefficients and substantially reduce the degrees offreedom of 
the regression model. This study includes electric utilities with different power 
generation technologies. A translog specification typically assumes similar technologies. 
The neoclassical model assumes that the industry is at its long-run equilibrium. With the 
market restructuring and the large number of mergers within the industry this 
assumption is in question. 
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A large number of operating, financial, and managerial characteristics should 
play a role in determining the average cost of electricity. As with most prior price and 
cost equations, variables representing capital, labor, and fuel costs will be included. 
Naturally, increases in the costs of these items are expected to lead to increases in 
average costs. Financial variables, such as the utility's bond rating, interest rates on 
long-term debt, and tax payments can be expected to increase the electricity's average 
cost. Without competitive pressures, utilities may add unnecessary staff, thus increasing 
costs. For some utilities, taxes account for three-quarters of the variation in price 
(Thompson, 1985). 
Operating factors, such as capacity under construction, make up of generating 
resources, line losses, density of the service territory, and age of the electric plant are 
also expected affect average costs. Construction work in progress (CWIP) should have 
a positive impact, either through its inclusion in the rate base or its negative impact on 
cash flow. Hydroelectric power is an inexpensive form of power generation and a 
larger share of electricity generated from this source should be associated with a 
decrease in cost. Electricity generation with nuclear power should increase the cost of 
electricity. Though initially deemed an inexpensive form of energy, nuclear energy has 
proven quite expensive due to high construction costs, unexpectedly low plant 
utilization rates and other reasons. Higher line losses are naturally associated with 
increased costs. A larger service territory requires more transmission lines per 
customer. However, as a service territory becomes more dense, additional costs are 
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incurred in laying underground transmission lines. With older plant, much of the capital 
expenses have been depreciated. Thus, lower costs can be charged. Older generating 
plant may also be less expensive to operate, even if the embedded costs are the same as 
in new plant. Older power plants and transmission and distribution facilities may not 
require the same environmental or safety standards as new plant. 
For a utility also supplying gas, administrative costs can most likely be kept 
lower due to synergistic effects such as combined customer records and billing 
procedures. The more industrial sales are a percentage of total sales, the greater 
expected electricity cost reductions. Industrial customers are less expensive to serve 
than residential and commercial customers. On average, industrial customers consume 
large amounts electricity reducing average fixed costs, and many of them consume 
high-voltage electricity, which is less expensive to supply. The less the population 
density of the service territory, the more expensive it is for a utility to supply electricity 
to its customers, and the greater the expanse, the more transmission and distribution 
system costs relative to its customer base. 
An unfiiendly regulatory climate is expected to lower the probability that PUCs 
will grant rate increases. This has a dampening effect on cost as utilities will make even 
more attempts to minimize costs. Though various federal laws already establish 
permitted emissions and wastes levels, state governments may make these levels even 
more restrictive. With one-fourth to one-third ofthe total cost for a new coal plant 
going into environmental control systems, these more restrictive regulations can 
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substantially affect costs (Rubin 1989). Some states now are moving towards requiring 
utilities to internalize environmental externalities within the utilities' cost structure, 
adding to the cost of electricity. 
ID.S. Scope of Analysis 
The EIA has collected DSM investment data since 1989, though these have 
only been available since 1990. The four years ofEIA data available (1990-1993) were 
analyzed in this study. DSM investment data were available from other sources, 17 but 
were not used in favor of staying with a single consistent data set. Also, the EIA 
surveys all major utilities making it possible to assume that utilities without reported 
DSM investment actually had little or no DSM expenditures. 
The EIA collects a large volume of annual data on the financial and operating 
characteristics of private and public utilities. Fairly detailed information available for, 
approximately18 180 largest investor-owned utilities is part of this data. At the end on 
1989, these utilities represented 99% of investor-owned utility sales and just under 
79% of total electricity revenues from sales to ultimate consumers in the United States. 
17 When this study was initially conceived, the analysis period was expected to be the 
1980's. During that period DSM investments were inconsistently reported by utilities. 
DSM expenditures from the decade were obtained from a variety of surveys (Cogan 
and Williams, 1985, 1987) (Nadel, 1991 ). In 1991, I also collected this expenditure data 
by surveying utilities and PUCs around the country. Collection methodologies between 
sources often caused expenditure figures for the same utilities to significantly differ. 
18 This is an approximate number as the number reported each year will vary slightly 
due to mergers and fluctuations in utility sizes. 
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Investor-owned utilities produce the bulk of the electricity used in the Umited States 
and the majority of these have f;inancial statistics published by the EIA. Using this 
group ofutilities to estimate the models described above, would give a dear indication 
ofthe DSM determinants and impacts in the United States. It would be difficult to 
include in this study municipal, federal, or other types of non-profit generators or 
electricity distributors. The Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
reporting guidelines differ between investor-owned utilities and the non-profit utilities. 
This causes some variables to be reported by investor-owne:d utilities but not by the 
non-profits. In addition, the non-profits are not regulated by the state PUCs but by 
elected boards. Finally, the profit motive, which supposedly spurs the in~estor-owned 
utilities into DSM program investments to reduce electricity prices and increase stock 
values, is missing from non-profit firms. 
Not all ofthe reported utilities can be analyzed as sc~parate econ01mic decision 
makers. Many utilities are operating units of holding companies and, th~refore, do not 
operate independently. Also, some reported utilities are actually partially1 owned by 
other utilities. This is true for a number of the nuclear powc~r plants in the Northeast, 
such as Connecticut Yankee or Maine Yankee, where up to nine utilities1 own varying 
shares in the plants. Even if only partial, ownership of othe1r utilities will1impact the 
operations and investment decisions of a particular utility. Analysis of individual 
economic agents requires investments and expenditures be aggregated to the holding 
company levels. In cases where partial ownership of a utility was evident, all variables 
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were weighted by the percentage owned. 19 This weighting was performed for each of 
the 900 EIA reported variables. 
Aggregating to the holding company level was particularly important because 
other utility data were obtained from Value Line, an investment publication which 
reports at the holding company level. Value Line was the source for a variety of 
financial data and items such as load factor, peak load, capacity, rate of return, dividend 
pay-out ratio, and average age of plant. Value Line also reported on merger activities 
and bankruptcies. Utilities were dropped if they had merged with another utility during 
the 4 year analysis period, as merger year data might be inconsistent, with some 
variables representing the utility before and others after the merger. El Paso Electric 
was excluded from the analysis because of its bankruptcy, which was thought to impact 
most of its operations and investment decisions. Other utilities were omitted if they 
were not reported in Value Line or Moody's Utilities.20 A few utilities were removed 
from the sample due to significant foreign operations or because most of their business 
activities were outside the electric utility industry. Texas-New Mexico Power was not 
included in the final sample because it did not have generating facilities. The final 
sample of holding companies with complete data for the four-year study period 
included 81 companies. These 81 actually represent 119 utility operating companies 
reported by the EIA. 
19 A simple example of this would be a generating company owned equally by two 
electric utilities. If30 MWh was sold by an operating company, the owners would each 
be associated with 50% of the power produced. 
20 Moody's Utilities was used as a source to determine ownership shares. 
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Table ID.l 
Utility Sample Attrition 
Sample Utilities 
Utilities reported on by EIA 1984-1993 190 
Utilities dropped 72 
Companies used in analysis 119 
Number ofholding companies in anaiysis 81 
Models estimated using the final sample of electric holding companies should 
provide a good indication of overall DSM impacts. In 1990, these electric utilities sold 
most ofthe electricity in the United States representing 60.7% of all electricity sold and 
78.6% of electricity sold by investor-owned utilities. In the same year, the utilities 
represented 83.5% oftotal nationally-reported DSM expenditures and 92% ofDS:M 
expenditures reported by all investor-owned utilities. 
Typically, customer characteristics are not available for most utilities except for 
sales to specific customer classes. Reported population or service area sizes are only 
available for a portion of the sample. What is known, however, are total sales to end 
users by state. This breakdown was available for 1993 from data published in EIA's 
Form 861. Total electric sales by state allow each utility's share of state electric sales to 
be calculated. The utility's share oftotal state electric sales is assumed to approximate 
service to the equivalent portion of the state's population and businesses. This 
assumption means a utility selling 50% of a state's electricity consumption will provide 
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services to 50% of its population and will deliver electricity to companies with 50% of 
the business activity. 
This assumption allows various state and regional level demographic data to be 
used to estimate utility customer characteristics. State and regional level variables 
include income, employment, weather variables, types of industrial activity, the 
regulatory environment, energy prices, and appliance stocks. A complete listing of 
variables and their sources is supplied in Appendix 1. 
Many utilities do not operate within a single state. For utilities operating in two 
or more states, customer demographic variables are calculated using the weighted 
average of each variable. The weight used is the percentage of total sales to end users 
sold in each stat~ seen as a percentage of total utility sales to end users. 
The final data set used in the analysis contained information on 81 electric 
utilities over a four-year period. Variables available were detailed information on the 
companies' financial and operating characteristics, approximated demographic data on 
each utility's customer base, information on the regulatory environment of each utility, 
weather variables, and prices of competing fuels. 
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IV. Empirical Estimation 
IV.l. Model Summary 
Four equations were estimated as part of this analysis. These models are 
specified as: 
1. DSM = f (Financial, Managerial, Operating, Customer, Regulatory) 
2. MIB Ratio = g (DSM, Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
3. Cost = j (DSM, Quantity Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
4. Quantity = k (DSM, Price, Fuel, Customer, Weather) 
Factors influencing DSM investments were incorporated in the first equation. 
The second equation estimated DSM impacts on the a utility's cost of equity capital, or 
stock price. The third equation estimated the average cost of producing electricity to 
determine how DSM influenced the average cost of producing electricity. The fourth 
equation was used to estimate DSM investments impacts on electricity demand. 
Variables used in the final models are shown on Table IV. I. They are separated into 
firm financiaVmanagerial and operating characteristics, customer and demographic 
characteristics, and regulatory environment characteristics. 
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Table IV.l 
Variables Used to Estimate Model 
Variable Variable Description Source 
Name 
Financial and 
Managerial 
ROR Rate of return on investment. Value Line 
PCTAX Taxes as a percentage of total expenditures. FERC Form 1 
PCCWIP CWIP as a percent oftotal electric plant "FERC Form 1 
investment. 
WAGES Natural log ofthe average utility wage. FERC Form 1 
PCGASREV Total gas operation revenues as a percent of FERCForm 1 
total utility revenues. 
DIVIDE:t-.,TD Dividend pay-out ratio. Value Line 
EQDBRAT The equity- debt ratio. Value Line 
MBRATIO Market-to-book ratio, the market share price Value Line 
divided by the book value per share. 
Operational 
PCIND Percentage of total sales to industrial customers. FERC Form 1 
PCDSM DSM percentage share oftotal expenditures. EIA Form 861 
and FERC 
Form 1 
PRICE Average price of electricity. FERC Form 1 
PCPURCH Percent oftotal power (purchased and FERC Form 1 
generated) that was purchased. 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Name 
LOAD The annual load factOi (ratio of average load Value Line 
divided by peak load)?1 
COOLDD Annual cooling degree-days. BLS 
DENSITY Pole miles per residential customer. FERC Form 1 
QUANTITY Total quantity electricity sold to final consumers FERC Form 1 
divided by number of residential customers. 
INVKWH The investment in plant per kWh generated or FERC Form 1 
purchased. 
PC NUKE Percent of generated and purchased power that FERC Form 1 
is generated by nuclear power plants. 
FUEL KWH Fuel costs per kWh generated. FERC Form 1 
PLANT Average age of utility plant. Value Line 
PCRESALE Total electricity resales as a percent of total FERC Form 1 
electricity sold. 
Customer 
PC INC Per capita income. BEAREIS 
RES KWH Average MWh consumption per residential FERC Form 1 
customer. 
GAS Price of natural gas. Gas Facts 
Yearbook 
PCMFG Manufacturing as a percentage of total BEAREIS 
employment. 
21 This was derived by computing the average annual hourly kWh demanded (total kWh 
sold divided by 8,760, the number of hours in the year). This was divided by the 
maximum hourly kWh demanded during the peak period (usually one specific hour). 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Name 
Regulatory 
PCPAPER Percentage of all employment income from the BEAREIS 
pulp and paper industry 
PCPMETAL Percentage of all employment income from the BEAREIS 
primary metals industry. 
LCUP Dummy variable indicating least-cost planning Mitchell 
required within the firm's service territory. (1989, 1992} 
1 =Required 
0 =Not required 
REGOOD Dummy Variable indicating the regulatory Value Line 
environment is rated above average. 
1 = Above average 
0 =Average or below average 
IV.2. DSM Investment Equation 
Large levels of investor-owned utility DSM investment were hypothesized to 
be caused by specific firm, customer, service territory, and regulatory characteristics. 
Simple models have been developed explaining investment levels in infrastructure and 
operations and maintenance expenses. Such a model has been adapted to explain DSM 
investments. The estimated DSM investment model has the general specification: 
60 
DSM = f (Financial, Managerial, Operating, Customer, Regulatory) 
Data were available on total DSM expenditures for 81 utilities over a four-year 
period of 1990 through 1991. Supplemental infonnation on utility characteristics, 
service area demographics, and regulatory climate were collected. These data allowed 
for a set of cross-section time-series models to be estimated. 
Variable scaling and nonnalization proved important as the utilities analyzed 
ranged from just under 1 million MWh sales to 119 million MWh sales. The equation's 
DSM variable was expressed as a percentage of total expenditures. All explanatory 
variables were either included in the equation as averages, ratios, or dummy variables. 
The explanatory variables included in the final model are shown in Table IV.2 along 
with the expected sign ofthe estimated parameter. 
Table IV.2 
DSM Investment Model Variables 
Variable Expected Variable Description 
Name Sign 
PCDSM Dependent DSM as percent of total expenditures 
Variable 
PCIND 
-
Percentage of total sales to industrial customers 
RES KWH + Average MWh consumption per residential customer 
PC INC ? Per capita income 
61 
Variable Expected Variable Description 
Name Sign 
PCPURCH + Percent of total power (purchased and generated) that 
was purchased 
LOAD + The annual load factor (ratio of average load divided by 
peak load) 
ROR + Rate of return on investment 
LCUP + Dummy variable indicating least-cost planning required 
within the firm's service territory 
I= Required, 0 =Not required 
REGOOD - Dummy Variable indicating the regulatory environment is 
rated above average 
I = above average, 0 = below average or average 
In addition, three dummy variables, Y91, Y92, and Y93, give ihe Jnodel the 
form of a fixed-effects cross-section time-series model. Given cross-section time-series 
data, it is possible the actual parameters differed between each times-series and/or 
cross-section. With 8I different cross-sections with only four time-series observations 
each, it was not considered viable to estimate varying coefficients for each utility. 
Varying coefficients were tested for across years22 (Table IV.3). The resulting F-test 
22 Two equations were estimated: a restricted model including 8 explanatory variables 
and the intercept, and an unrestricted model that included annual interaction terms for 8 
explanatory variables and different intercepts for each year. The F statistic of0.92 was 
not statistically significant and was calculated as: 
((ESSR- ESSUR)/q)/(ESSUR/(N-k)= ((437-402)/27)/(402/(324-36) 
Where ESSUR was the error sum of squares of the unrestricted model with varying 
coefficients, and ESSR was the error sum of squares ofthe model where the parameters 
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rej1 cted the hypothesis that all coefficients varied across all years. Yeanly dummy 
var ·abies were included in the model because specifYing different jntercepts for each 
ye« r were found to be statistically significant when compared to the restricted model. 
The calculated F statistic was 4. 2, which is significant at the 1% l~vel. :Z:l 
In regression estimation, other statistical problems can oqcur which may result 
in i iasing the parameter estimates, their variances, or the efficienc;y of the estimate. 
Tv o problems typically looked for with cross-section time-series models are 
au· ocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Autocorrelation arises wh.en en·or terms are 
correlated with one another. The presence of autocorrelation do~s not ~bias the 
coefficient estimated using OLS. However, inefficient variances 9fthe1parameter 
es1 imates typically result. Testing and correcting for autocorrelation is,not really 
applicable for the data set being analyzed. The data have only fot1r years of data for 
each firm. Testing for autocorrelation for each cross-sections' fo).lr-year time period 
w1 uld have dubious results. In addition, correction for even the ~implest first-order 
autocorrelation model would result in the loss of one-quarter of the observations, 
le: ding to a serious reduction in the efficiency of the estimation. 
Heteroscedasticity arises when the variance of the error term is not constant 
across sample observations. Heteroscedasticity does not bias the parameters' estimate~. 
However, heteroscedasticity can result in inefficient estimators. 
did not vary over the years. The number of restrictions placed on the 11nodel number 
was q, k was the number of parameters in the unrestricted model and N was the 
m mber of observations. 
23 Hypothesis test inputs are reported in Appendix 3. 
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The presence ofheteroscedasticity was tested for using the Breusch-Pagan 
test24 (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). All explanatory variables were included in the 
regression used to estimate the test statistjc as oo particular regression variable was 
suspected of causing the heteroscedasticity. The calculated test statistic was 128, which 
at 8 degrees of freedom leads to rejection ofthe null hypothesis ofhomoscedasticity. 
Detecting heteroscedasticity with these itests is straightforward; correction for 
heteroscedasticity is not. Correcting for heteroscedasticity requires making certain 
assumptions about the functional form of the heteroscedasticity. As ordinary least 
squares (OLS) offers unbiased estimates pfthe1parameters, the method developed by 
White (1980) was used to calculate a het~roscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance 
matrix (HCV)?5 This method is extremely usdul as it allows us to make appropriate 
24 The Breusch-Pagan test estimates the test statistic through a two-stage procedure. 
The equation: 
y = (X. + p:z + E 
that is suspected of having heteroscedasticity i:s estimated using OLS, where the 
dependent variable Y is a function of int~rcept. a. and the vector of explanatory 
variables Z. The error term is E. The esti1nated error term is squared and divided by the 
asymptotic variance of the error term anll the regression: 
A2 
~ =: a+bZ+e 
a 
is estimated. Where the estimated error t.erm squared e2 is divided by the asymptotic 
variance of the error term ri defined as t.he mean of the squared residuals. The test 
statistic is half of the regression ( explain~d) SUim of squares. This test statistic is 
distributed asymptotically as a chi-squar~d distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of variables in Z. This is a, geneiral test for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and does not require ~~ny prrior knowledge of the functional form that 
the heteroscedasticity takes. 
25 White's HCV is calculated by constm~ting the diagonal matrix G where the diagonal 
terms are the squared residual terms fro1n the 1original OLS regression. The HCV 
matrix is then estimated by computing the GyS variance-covariance matrix (X' X)· 
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statistical inferences based on the result of the OLS without specifying the fonn of 
heteroscedasticity. The parameters' standard errors and t statistics were reestimated for 
the model using the HCV(Table IV.4). 
Table VI.3 
DSM Investment Equation Hypothesis Testing 
What Was tested Test and Test Result 
Statistic 
Varying slopes and F-test Not statistically significant 
intercepts for each year F statistic= 0.92 
Varying slopes for each F-test Not statistically significant 
year with one intercept F statistic= 0.85 
Varying intercepts for each F-test Statistically significant 
year F statistic= 3.88 Fixed-effects model specified 
Heteroscedasticity Breusch-Pagan Test Presence of 
Chi-squared statistic = Heteroscedasticity detected. 
128 White's HCV estimated 
1X'GX(X'X)"\ where the X matrix consists of all the explanatory variables. The square 
roots ofthe diagonal tenns ofthis matrix are the HCV standard errors associated with 
each coefficient. 
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Table IV.4 
Parameter Estimates of tlte DSM Investment Equation 
(N = 324 R2 = 0.41 log-lik<tlihood -502.04) 
Variable Paraml!ter Estimate Standard Error t Statistic 
INTERCEPT -4.328546 I 1.137 -3.806 
Y91 -0.05171"2 I 0.1280 -0.4046 
Y92 0.49656~ I 0.1734 2.864 
Y93 0.429587 ' 0.1864 2.304 
' 
PCIND -0.0153;t4 
' 
0.005964 -2.573 
RES KWH 0.113888 ' 0.03009 3.784 
' 
PC INC 0.118443 I 0.02684 4.413 
PCPURCH 0.007154 I 0.005477 1.306 
LOAD 0.021909 I 0.01162 1.885 
ROR 0.0544()0 I 0.02732 1.991 
LCUP 0.9601$9 I 0.1913 5.018 
REGOOD 1.1878$2 0.2741 4.334 
The regression e~uatioqs overall performance proved satisfactory because most 
of the explanatory variables haye parameter estimates with the correct sign and are also 
statistically significant. The sig~1 of the parameter estimates were, for the most part, as 
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expected, with the exception ofthe income, PCINC, and the regulatory climate, 
REGOOD. The estimated R2 of0.41 does indicate that much ofthe variation in DSM 
spending remains to be explained. 
Utility characteristic variables includeq in the model were the rate of return, 
ROR, load factor, LOAD, and percentage oftotal power purchased, PPURCH. The 
estimated rate of return parameter (0.05), wa~ small and positive. This indicated 
financially healthier utilities tended to invest 111ore in DSM.1 It is possible that the 
direction of causality was the reverse, since firms investing in DSM may be allowed a 
higher rate of return. The actual absolute impact was quite1 small given a one-point 
increase in the rate of return increased the DSM share oft0tal expenditures by just 
0.02. The positive relationship between the a1mualload factor, LOAD, and DSM 
indicates that DSM investments were possibly being used to defer capacity. A lower 
load factor indicates excess capacity during off-peak periods, but as the load factor 
becomes higher, the reserve margin shrinks, ~hus producing the need for more capacity. 
DSM investments that shift load and conserve electricity tend to lower the overall load 
factor and the need for additional capacity investments. The purchased power 
parameter estimate (0.007) was positive, indicating that utilities may have been trying 
to replace purchased power through investment in DSM "1negawatts." However, the 
parameter was not statistically different from zero, and the impact of the estimated 
coefficient was quite small, as the model prepicts that a utility purchasing 100% of its 
electricity would only increase DSM's share oftotal expenditures by 0.7. 
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The percent of electricity sold to industrial customers, PCIND, had the 
expected negative sign (-0.015). A negative parameter was expected because industrial 
customers have used their market power to lobby for less DSM. Another interpretation 
could be that utilities tend to target industrial customers less in DSM programs and, 
therefore, utilities with greater industrial sales have, in general, less DSM 
expenditures?6 Again, the absolute Impact of the industrial customers' share of 
consumption was quite small, as the regression predicted that a utility with only 
industrial customers would decrease DSM' s share of total expenditures by 1. 5 points. 
The average residential consumption, RESKWH, had the hypothesized positive 
impact on DSM expenditures (0.11 ). This positive relationship was assumed because 
larger per-customer consumption should be associated with more end uses per 
customer. With more end uses more appliances and equipment are available to target 
and more areas exist for potential energy savings. Higher consumption levels also allow 
DSM program implementation to become more cost-effective if there are fixed costs to 
providing DSM services. The estimated coefficient indicates that a utility with average 
annual residential customers consuming 15,000 kWh versus one with residential 
consumption of only 5,000 kWh per year will have a one-point higher DSM share of 
total expenditures. 
26 Lower DSM investments in industrial customers could be due less market 
imperfections that prevent industrial customers from investing in DSM. Industrial 
customers will have better access to capital than residential customers and have a profit 
incentive to invest in energy-efficient processes and equipment. 
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In the case of income, PCINC, utilities in areas with higher per capita incomes 
were associated with grea'ter DSM expenditures. It had been hypothesized that larger 
number oflow-income customers would bring about greater levels ofDSM investment. 
A lower per capita income would be associated with a greater number of low-income 
customers. However, the parameter estimate (0.12), was positive and indicated that for 
every thousand dollar increase in average per capita income DSM's share of total 
expenditures increased by one-tenth of one-point. The positive correlation could have 
been because people with higher incomes demand more DSM. People with higher 
incomes could have more to gain from DSM programs due to greater appliance stocks, 
or lower discount rates will increase their propensity to invest in energy-efficiency 
measures. lfDSM was viewed as a competing good to electricity of higher quality, it is 
possible DSM demand increases with income, simply because these people will be 
willing to pay more for higher quality sources of electricity. 
The two regulatory variables, LCUP and REGOOD, had a considerable impact 
on DSM investments. The model predicted that a utility operating within states with 
least-cost planning and above average regulatory environment were likely to increase 
DSM expenditures by over 2% of total expenditures. Given that DSM shares of total 
utility expenditures averaged 1.41% for the four-year analysis period, this is a 
considerable impact. The least-cost planning variable was obtained from two studies 
done by Mitchell (1989, 1992). The studies classified the state ofleast-cost planning in 
each state for the years 1989 and 1991. States were classified into five categories, no 
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progress in LCUP, ifLCUP was under consideration, ifLCUP was under development, 
ifLCUP was in implementations, and whether LCUP was being practiced. During 1989 
seven states had LCUP that was in practice which increased to 14 in 1991. 
Results for these two years were extended to the adjoining years. The variable 
was a one ifleast-cost planning had been implemented in states making up over 50% of 
a utility's service territory and zero otherwise. Least-cost planning compels utilities to 
consider DSM and supply-side resources when developing resource plans. It is, 
however, the potential pro-DSM regulatory climate and not just the integration of 
DSM into resource plans that causes the relationship between LCUP and DSM to be 
positive. The parameter estimate of0.96 indicated that least-cost planning requirements 
would increase DSM's share of total expenditures by the same amount. 
The regulatory climate variable REGOOD was obtained from Value Line. 
Value Line classified the regulatory climate of utilities as average, above average, and 
below average. This qualitative rating was converted into a binary variable that was one 
in an above average regulatory environment and zero otherwise. It was expected that a 
"PUC driven " DSM would be associated with states with below average regulatory 
climates. Also, it was assumed that PUCs coercing utilities into implementing DSM 
programs would receive a below average regulatory climate rating. This proved not to 
be the case, as the parameter estimate (1.2 ) was positive and statistically different from 
zero. The model predicted that utilities operating in an above average regulatory 
climate would increase DSM's share of total spending by 1.2 points. Perhaps in a good 
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regulatory environment the PUC will structure the incentives to invest in DSM in such 
a ways as to make such an investment profitable. In monetary terms a 1.2% of total 
expenditures of the average tltility would! represent approximately $14.5 million. 
The model showed an apparent shift in DSM spending in 1992 and 1993 
relative to 1990 and 1991. TWs is seen fi·om the yearly dummy variable coefficients 
where in the two later years the average utility increased its DSM share of total 
expenditures by respectively 0.5 and 0.43 of a percentage point. 
An important result of the model was to show that the regulatory environment 
played a very significant role in DSM spi~nding. Given this result, one can expect 
reductions in the levels ofD~M spending with the onset of industry restructuring and 
deregulation. Industry restru~turing will not necessarily mean the end of regulator 
driven DSM. After industry restructuring, PUCs may still regulate transmission and 
distribution companies and r~quire them to offer DSM services perhaps financing this 
by assessing a line charge. 
Many other explanatc~ry variables were considered for inclusion in the model. 27 
All of these variables proved not to have: a statistically significant impact on the level of 
DSM expenditures. The one variable that was expected to have a strong relationship 
with DSM spending levels WflS price. It had been expected that higher prices would 
result in the PUC placing greater pressur:e on the utility to invest in DSM. Also, higher 
27 Included in these variables were regional dummy variables and a variable for the 
number of states in which th~ utility operated. Statistically insignificant coefficients 
were estimated for all of the~e variables. 1 
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prices should result in larger numb~rs ofDSM opportunities becoming cost-effective. 
However, the average price and price of each cuistomer class all appeared not to be 
correlated with DSM investments. 
IV.3. Cost ofEquity Capital Equation 
DSM investment was hypothesized to have an impact on the value of the 
utility's stock. Successful and unsuccessful corporate strategies should be rewarded 
(penalized) by an increase (decreas~) in the value of their stock. Earlier studies have 
investigated the effect ofthe regul~tory climate on the cost of equity capital. The way 
in which the market values DSM, ~sa corporate strategy, is of more interest now that 
the industry is restructuring. The simple equation that was estimated is quite similar to 
those used in earlier studies and is ~pecified as: 
MIB Ratio = g (DSM, Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
where MIB ratio was the market-tq-book ratio, defined as the stock market price per 
share divided by the book value per share. This ratio quantified the relationship 
between a utility's common stock price and the 'pook value of the assets?8 Utilities that 
28 The book value is an accounting term, calculated as the sum of all assets minus the 
sum of all debts, liabilities, and preferred share prices. 
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pursue a corporate strategy favored by the market can expect the MIB ratio to rise as 
the stock price is bid up relative to the book value. Valiables included in the model are 
presented in Table IV.S 
Table IV.S 
Cost of Equity Capital Equation Variables 
Variable Expected Variable Label 
Name Sign 
MBRATIO Dependent Market-to-book ratio, the market share price 
Variable divided by the book value per share. 
PLANT + Average age of utility plant 
EQDBRAT 
-
The equity- debt ratio 
PClliD n Perct':ntage of industrial sales ! 
ROR + Rate of return 
REGOOD + Dummy variable indicating the regulatory 
environment is rated above average 
LCUP ? Dummy variable indicating least-cost planning 
required within the finn's service territory 
DIVIDEND + Dividend pay-out ratio 
PCDSM 
-
DSM as a percentage of total expenses 
PCCWIP - CWIP as percent oftotal utility plant and equipment 
PCRESALE + Percent of total sales that are to other utilities 
73 
The tests performed on the model are shown in Table V1.6. F-tests indicated 
that slope parameters and the intercept varied in a statistically significant fashion for all 
of the four years. The same was true for a regressions that either specified that slopes 
varied or intercepts varied over all four years. However, after a fixed-effects model was 
specified, a F-test indicated that there was not statistical grounds for specifying 
different slope parameters in addition to the varying intercepts since the F statistic was 
1.01. 
The Breusch-Pagan test indicated that heteroscedasticity was present. As in the 
DSM investment equations above, instead of correcting for heteroscedasticity, HCV 
standard errors and t statistics were calculated and presented with the parameter 
estimates on Table VI. 7. 
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Table VI.6 
Cost of Equity Capital Model Hypothesis Testing 
What Was tested Test and Test Statistic Result 
Varying slopes and F-test Statistically significant 
intercepts for each year F statistic= 5.17 
Varying slopes for each F-test Statistically significant 
year with one intercept F statistic= 5.6 
Varying intercepts for F-test Statistically significant 
each year F statistic= 42.3 
Varying intercepts for F-test . Not statistically 
each year vs. varying F statistic = 1. 01 significant 
slopes and intercepts Fixed-effects model 
for each year specified 
Heteroscedasticity Breusch-Pagan Test Presence of 
Chi-squared statistic = Heteroscedasticity 
40.5 detected. 
White's HCV estimat€id 
75 
Table IV.7 
Parameter Es.timates of the Cost of Equity Equation Error and t Statistic 
(N= 324 R2 = 0.88 log-likelihood= -1,383) 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Statistic 
INTERCEPT 4.011668 8.709 0.460 
Y91 8.098673 2.536 3.194 
Y92 22.569784 2.624 8.601 
Y93 32.480163 3.068 10.59 
PLANT 1.234811 0.9181 1.345 
EQDBRAT 1.217913 0.1508 8.078 
PCIND 0.277331 0.08997 3.083 
ROR 3.114928 0.5784 5.386 
REGOOD 5.165617 3.486 1.482 
LCUP -8.930453 2.896 -3.084 
DIVIDEND I 1.829703 0.4530 4.039 
PCDSM 1.909826 0.9304 2.053 
PCCWIP -0.435635 0.09706 -4.488 
PCRESALE ' -0.136690 0.07167 -1.907 
' 
76 
The overall regression .r:esults were quite fruitful in that the explanatory 
variables included in the regression explain 64% of the variance and had, for the most 
part, parameter estimates that were significantly different from zero. The parameters 
estimated in the equation also had the expected signs. The annual intercepts, Y91, Y92, 
and Y93, captureq much of the steady rise that utility stocks were experiencing over 
this four-year period?9 
Variables ~hat had a very significant impact on the MIB ratio were the rate of 
return, ROR, and the dividend lpay-out ratio, DIVIDEND. A one-point increase in the 
rate of return, ROR was predi¢ted by the model to cause a 3.1 point increase in the 
MIB ratio.30 The ~iividend pay-·out ratio, DIVIDEND, had less of an impact as a one 
pint increase in the dividend pay-out ratio was associated with a 1.8 point increase in 
the MIB ratio. ln(ireased stock prices should be associated with utilities that have 
greater earnings qnd provide greater annual income to their stockholders. 
For every point the equity-debt ratio, EQDBRAT, increased the MIB ratio was 
expected to increjlse by 1.2 points. This indicated that more leveraged utilities tended 
to have a lower ~1/B ratio. Tllis in turn showed that the market penalized the use of 
debt financing. 
29 Average utility stock prices 1increased a total of36% over the four-year time period 
whereas the intercepts account for an average rise of 26%. 
30 The average utflity stock had a mean MB ratio of 1.45 during the analysis period. 
Therefore, a 3.1\ point increase in the MB ratio is the equivalent of2% increase in 
valuation. 
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The market appeared to favor utilities that do not invest heavily in new 
construction. Practically a half a point decrease ( -0.43) in the MIB ratio was associated 
with each percentage point increase in PCCWIP, which is CWIP's share of the total 
utility plant investment. That the market put higher valuation on utilities that deferred 
capital expenditures was also revealed with the parameter estimate of the average age 
of plant, PLANT. This parameter estimate indicated that for year increase in mean age 
of plant the MIB ration increase by 1.2 points. Part ofthis impact on MIB ration is also 
due to the fact that as plant ages it depreciates and lowers the book value of the firm. If 
stock value decreases at a lower rate than the asset value due to depreciation the MIB 
ratio will increase. 
That DSM defers new construction might be an explanation for the finding that 
DSM expenditures were treated favorably by the market. In the case of the DSM 
variable, PCDSM, a one percent increase in DSM's share of total expenditures were 
associated with a 1.9 point increase in the MIB ratio. That DSM had such a strong 
impact of the MIB ration was an important finding. This statistically significant 
parameter estimate indicated that the market puts considerable value on a corporate 
strategy that incorporated DSM programs and services. It was possible that DSM acted 
as a proxy for other variables such as utility innovation or the level of customer services 
the utility offers. If it was DSM investment that brings about the higher stock values 
then it is possible that after the electric industry is deregulated that DSM services will 
still be offered by utilities because it is a good corporate strategy. 
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Utilities that have a large industrial customer base could be expected to have 
I 
higher stock prices since industrial customers wiill have lower administrative costs 
i 
associated with them and provide large and stable loads. Also, many industrial 
customers have large 24 hour electricity loads that utilize the! utilities off-peak, excess 
capacity. This is expected to change after retail wheeling comes into existence. At that 
time, industrial customers should have a greater tendency to switch from one supplier 
to the next, for small marginal changes in price. The industrial customer share of sales, 
PCIND, had a positive, statistically significant parameter estimate (0.28), that indicated 
that the market bid up the share price of utilities with a larger industrial customer base. 
I 
A ten point increase in the market share of industrial customers was associated with a 
2.8 point increase in the MIB ratio. 
The regulatory environment variable, REGOOD, had a parameter estimate of 
5.17. This indicated that utilities operating in an above average regulatory environment 
I 
had a MIB ratio that was 5.17 points higher than a comparable utility operating in 
average or below average regulatory environm~mts. This reswlt was not statistically 
different from zero. The least-cost planning durnmy variable,1 LCUP, had an estimated 
I 
coefficient of -8.9. This indicated that utilities operating in states that required least-
1 
cost planning suffered from decreased stock prices. That thei MfB ratio decreased by 
i 
nearly 9 points with least-cost planning is a good indication that the market does not 
I 
put much stock in mandated least-cost planning. 
I 
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Comparisons between this and earlier studies may not be appropriate as the 
electric industry has changed considerably since the time of the earlier studies. One 
indication of this is that earlier models incorporated f;u fe~er explanatory variables yet 
had similar explanatory power (Dubin and Navarro, 1982).1That more variables were 
correlated with the MIB ratio was possibly a sign that factors influencing an electric 
utility's stock price have become more complex now than ~n the past. Another, reason 
for this difference was that only a cross-sectional datil was :analyzed in the earlier study. 
This would tend to reduce much of the variance in stock values since they fluctuate 
over time. 
One area in which results are not quite comp11rable:is the impact of regulatory 
environment. In earlier studies that took place in the seventies a good regulatory 
environment was positively correlated with cost of Ciipital.: However later studies 
carried out in the eighties indicated that this regulatory power over the utilities cost of 
capital had waned. The equation estimated above inqicatecll that regulatory environment 
still has an impact on the utilities' cost of equity capital. , 
IV.4. Electricity Demand Equation 
Since the early eighties, utilities have been investing large sums of money into 
DSM. DSM has been promoted as a way to meet ex;isting and growing customer 
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demand in electricity without investing in potentially costly generating plant, 
transmission, and distribution facilities. Though small as a percentage of total 
expenditures, DSM investments have become quite sizable, with over $2 billion spent 
in 1993. The effects ofDSM on electricity demand was investigated by estimating a 
simple demand model. The estimated DSM investment model has the general 
specification: 
Quantity = k (DSM, Price, Fuel, Customer, Weather) 
where the quantity of electricity demanded was a function ofDSM investment, price of 
electricity, Price, customer characteristics, Customer, prices of competing fuels, Fuel, 
and weather conditions, Weather, that influence electricity consumption31 . As DSM 
programs will aiTt:ci. a wide variety of cusiumer classes, demand for electricity was 
analyzed at the utility level. The dependent variable, quantity, was entered into the 
equation as the natural logarithm of the total MWh sold to all customer classes divided 
by the number of residential customers. This is to approximate a population -weighted 
consumption and make the utilities more comparable. All other variables that were not 
percentages were also entered into the equation as natural logarithms. 
31 These are weather conditions that influence, such end uses as electric space heating. 
space cooling or lighting. 
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Table IV.S 
Demand for Electricity Equation Variables 
Variable Expected Variable Label 
Name Sign 
QUANTITY Dependent Natural log oftotal MWhs sold to final 
Variable consumers divided by the number of residential 
customers. 
PCDSM ? DSM percentage share of total expenditures 
PRICE 
-
Natural log of the average price of electricity 
GAS + Natural log ofthe price of natural gas 
PCMFG + Manufacturing as a percentage of total 
employment 
PC INC + Natural log ofthe average per capita income 
COOLDD + Natural log of the annual cooling degree-days 
DENSITY 
-
Natural log of Pole miles per residential customer 
PCPAPER + Percentage of all employment income from the 
pulp and paper industry 
PCPMETAL + Percentage of all employment income from the 
primary metals industry 
The estimated equation went through a number of tests similar to those 
described in the DSM investment model section above (Table VI.9). The possibility 
that coefficients varied over the years for all variables was tested with an F-test. The 
resulting F statistic of0.69 did not indicate that the slopes and intercepts were different 
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for each year. Additional F-tests were perfonned to determine if only slopes differed, or 
if only intercepts differed between years. The F-tests revealed that slopes did not 
appear to vary between years and that specifYing a fixed-effects model with separate 
annual intercepts was appropriate since the intercepts were statistically different from 
zero. 
Using the Breusch-Pagan test again resulted in the detection of 
heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedasticity was not corrected for, but HCV standard 
errors and t-tests were calculated. 
Table VI.9 
Demand for Electricity Model Hypothesis testing 
What Was tested Test and Test Statistic Result 
Varying slopes and F-test Not statistically significant 
intercepts for each year F statistic= 0.69 
Varying slopes for each F-test Not statistically significant 
year with one intercept F statistic =0.75 
Varying intercepts for F-test Statistically significant 
each year F statistic = 3. 7 Fixed-effects model used 
Heteroscedasticity Breusch-Pagan Test Presence of 
Chi-squared statistic = heteroscedasticity 
139 detected. 
White's HCV estimated 
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Table IV.lO 
Parameter Estimates of the Demand for Electricity Equation 
(N= 324 R2 = 0.73 log-likelihood= 136.6) 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Variable Error t Statistic 
CONSTANT -3.821700 1.464000 -2.611 
Y91 -0.019376 0.025790 -0.7512 
Y92 0.070512 0.026360 2.675 
Y93 0.032548 0.026490 1.229 
PRICE -0.634480 0.050450 -12.580 
PCDSM -0.030450 0.008292 -3.672 
GAS 0.052589 0.055690 0.9443 
PCMFG 1.036900 0.277900 3.731 
PC INC 0.371980 0.147000 2.530 
COOLDD 0.231960 0.019980 11.610 
DENSITY -0.028309 0.009531 -2.970 
PCPAPER 2.502300 1.829000 1.368 
PCPMETAL 4.393700 1.106000 3.973 
This equation for the demand for electricity performed quite well. All of the 
variables had the expected sign and most of the explanatory variables had parameter 
estimates that were statistically different from zero. Close to 70% of the variance in the 
quantity demand is explained by the few variables included in the equation. What was 
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particularly heartening was that for the price of electricity, PRICE, the estimated own-
price elasticity was -.63, which was within the ranges estimated by earlier studies (Bohi 
1981, 1984). The price elasticity should be interpreted as the weighted average for all 
customer classes. The estimated coefficient for per capita income, PCINC, was 0.37. 
This estimated income elasticity was also within the ranges of earlier studies. Again, a 
direct correspondence with the values estimated for one customer class was not 
possible. For this study, the demand of all customer classes is aggregated and therefore 
the price elasticity is a weighted average for all the customer classes. The estimated 
cross-price elasticity ofthe gas price, GAS, was 0.05, and had the expected positive 
sign. However, the estimated parameter was quite small and not statistically different 
from zero. This would seem to argue that inter-fuel competition between gas and 
electricity will not be greatly affected by marginal changes in the price of gas. . 
That the estimated elasticities had the correct sign and approximated those 
estimated in other studies in magnitude bolsters the results of this equation. The 
equation was estimated, primarily, to determine the impact ofDSM investment. The 
parameter estimate ofthe DSM variable, PCDSM, was -0.03. The coefficient was 
statistically significant and indicated that DSM expenditures were associated with 
reductions in electricity demand. However, DSM's impact on the demand for electricity 
was quite small as a one-point increase in DSM's share of total expenditures was only 
associated with a 0.03% decrease in electricity consumption. 
85 
The investment cost for each kWh saved can be estimated for the average 
utility. The average utility had $1.2 billion annual expenditures during the analysis 
period. A 1% share oftotal expenditure was equal to $12 million. This level ofDSM 
expenditures was associated with a 0.03% decrease in total electricity demand. As the 
average utility produced approximately 21.4 million MWh of electricity this was a 
decrease of6,850 MWh for every $12 million dollar spent on DSM. This represented 
DSM expenditures of approximately $1,750 per MWh reduction or $1.75 per kWh 
reduction. The relatively modest amount of energy savings that were associated with 
DSM spending may be cost-effective under certain fairly restrictive assumptions.32 
Other factors that may have obscured the effects ofDSM are spillover, load 
growth and service retention strategies, or federal and state energy efficiency standards. 
Spillover refers to many programs sponsored by utilities having impacts that are not 
just confined to their service territories. Utility advertising that promotes energy-
efficient products and energy use practices will also be seen and heard by customers of 
32Cost per kWh saved or "negawatt" are presented in the table below, using simple pay-
back calculations that assume the electricity cost escalation and the utility discount 
rates are the same and only the DSM investment lifetime varies. 
Simple Pay-back Calculations On DSM Investments 
DSM Investment Life Cost Per "negawatt" 
10 $0.175 
15 $0.116 
20 $0.087 
30 $0.058 
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adjacent utilities. Other direct spillover effects would come through population 
movements. A person may have received an energy-efficient refrigerator while being 
the customer at one utility. After changing jobs and place ofresidence the person 
becomes a customer of a different utility and has transferred the DSM savings 
embodied in the refrigerator to the new utility. 
A utility with programs incorporating strategic load growth, off-peak load 
growth, and service retention strategies will have more electricity demanded from it 
relative to a utility without DSM programs. Strategic load growth strategies seek to 
promote electro-technologies and increase electricity's market share in specific end 
uses. Programs promoting energy-efficient air-conditioners to first-time buyers will 
only lead to increased demand for electricity. Off-peak load growth would be fostered 
through lower rates. Many programs promoting hot water or cold storage have been 
implemented using these rates. Programs that target load retention will cause the utility 
to lose less load relative to utilities that are not promoting such programs. Programs 
that target new purchases of electric water heaters will retain the water heating loads of 
customers that would have otherwise switched to gas. 
Energy-efficiency standards will result in greater impacts on electricity demand 
ofutilities that are situated in areas of higher growth. This is because increased 
customers and income will be associated with greater levels of new construction and 
purchases of new electricity appliances and equipment. New appliances and new 
buildings will also be more energy-efficient. 
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DSM should not be judged only by its energy impacts. DSM investments defer 
other investments in generation capacity. These impacts cannot be known since 
generation never built is never reported. However, DSM impacts the long-run 
construction of power plants and investments in transmission and distribution facilities 
is an area of further research. 
The level of manufacturing activity, PC.r.AFG, in the service territory had the 
expected positive sign. The estimated parameter of 1.03 indicated that for every one-
point increase manufacturing has in the share oftotal employment there an associated 
1% increase in electricity consumption. The type of industrial activity also played a 
measurable role in electricity demand. Both the paper and pulp industry, PCP APER, 
(2.5) and primary metals industry, PCPMET AL, (4.4) as measured by the share in total 
employment income, had the expected positive parameter signs. These two industries 
are highly energy intensive (Kahane and Squitieri, 1987), and greater levels of industrial 
activity in theses areas are expected to increase electricity demand. However, in the 
case the of the paper industry the parameter was not statistically different from zero. 
For the paper industry ,a one-point increase in the share of total employment income 
resulted in an increase in electricity demand of2.5%. The primary metals industry had 
an even stronger relationship, as electricity demand to increased by 4.4% for each one-
point increase in the share of employment income. 
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The cooling degree-day variable,33 COOLDD, with the parameter estimate 
0.23, was associated with greater levels of electricity consumption. Weather conditions 
were expected to influence the demand for electricity with cooling degree-days giving 
an indication of the cooling requirements in any given year. The estimated coefficient 
indicated that a utility with a service territory in a wanner climate with cooling degree-
days 4% greater than average will be associated with almost a 1% increase in annual 
demand. 
A service territory density variable, DENSITY, was constructed by dividing the 
number of residential customers by the number of miles of transmission lines. Demand 
for electricity was expected to be negatively related to the density inter-fuel 
competition may increase with greater density given that gas service will be less 
available to customers in rural areas. Another possible reason for the negative 
relationship could be that there are less industrial and commercial customers in rural 
areas, which will also bring down the demand for electricity. The parameter estimate of 
-0.03 did confonn with this hypothesis and though the parameter was statistically 
different from zero the actual impact was quite small. 
33 Cooling degree-days are a unit measuring the extent that the outdoor mean daily 
temperature falls above the base (in this case, 65 degrees). The cooling days were 
population weighted by state, and weighted further by utility sales in each state. 
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IV.S. Electricity Average Cost Equation 
DSM has been promoted as a least-cost alternative to adding capacity in both 
generation plant and transmission and distribution facilities. On the assumption that 
DSM investment is a lower-cost alternative to other investments in other factors of 
production, one should expect that utilities that are investing in DSM resources would 
have lower costs associated with production of electricity. To determine the magnitude 
ofDSM's impact on cost an average cost equation was estimated with the general 
form: 
Cost = j (DSM, Quantity, Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
As DSM investment is affected by a variety of factors, a more general form of 
the cost function is specified. The dependent variable, average cost, was calculated by 
dividing the total reported electric utility expenditures by the total number of kWh sold 
to final customers and on the wholesale market. This variable and is entered into the 
equation as a natural logarithm. 
The tests that were performed on the model are shown in Table VI.7. F-tests 
indicated that slope parameters and the intercept did not vary in a statistically 
significant fashion in for all of the four years. The Breusch-Pagan test indicated that 
heteroscedasticity was present. As with the earlier models instead of correcting for 
heteroscedasticity HCV standard errors were calculated, as were t-tests based on them. 
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Table IV.ll 
Average Cost of Electricity Equation Variables 
Variable Expected Variable Label 
Name Sign 
AVGCOST Dependent Natural log ofthe average kWh cost 
Variable 
QUANTITY 
-
Natural log of the total quantity electricity sold to final 
consumers divided by number of residential customers 
PCPURCH + Purchased power as percent of total electricity sold. 
PCDSM 
-
DSM as percent oftotal expenditures. 
INVKWH + Natural log ofthe investment in plant per kWh 
generated or purchased. 
PC NUKE + Percent of generated and purchased power that is 
generated by nuclear power plants. 
FUEL KWH + Natural log ofthe fuel costs per kWh generated. 
PCTAX + Taxes as a percentage oftotal expenditures. 
PCCWIP + CWIP as a percent of total electric plant investment. 
PLANT 
-
Natural log ofthe average age ofutility plant. 
RES KWH - Natural log ofthe average annual consumption of a 
residential customer. 
WAGES + Natural log ofthe average utility wage. 
PCGASREV - Total gas operation revenues as a percent oftotal utility 
revenues. 
PCRESALE - Total electricity resales as a percent oftotal electricity 
sold. 
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Table VI.12 
Demand for Electricity Model Hypothesis Testing 
What Was tested Test and Test Statistic Result 
Varying slopes and F-test Not statistically significant 
intercepts for each year F statistic= 0.69 
Varying slopes for each F-test Not statistically significant 
year F statistic= 0.72 
Varying intercepts for each F-test Not statistically significant 
year F statistic= 0. 74 
Heteroscedasticity Breusch-Pagan Test Presence of 
Chi-squared statistic = Heteroscedasticity 
40.5 detected. 
White's HCV estimated 
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Table IV.13 
Parameter Estim~tes olfthe Average Cost of Electricity Equation 
(N= 324 R2 = 0.88 log-likelihood 304.3) 
Variable ',Parameter Estimate Standard t Statistic 
Error 
INTERCEPT -i.443700 0.320400 -7.627000 
QUANTITY -<).311190 0.024410 -12.750000 
PCPURCH 0.308000 0.041060 7.501000 
PCDSM -0.003:209 0.003301 -0.972100 
INVKWH 0.1245i50 0.027550 4.520000 
PC NUKE 0.004000 0.000445 8.986000 
FUEL KWH 0.354650 0.023940 14.810000 
PCTAX 0.003910 0.001338 2.922000 
PCCWIP (1.248160 0.087630 2.832000 
PLANT ~0.176880 0.028050 -6.307000 
RES KWH ~0.197410 0.030950 -6.379000 
WAGES . t).023t526 0.024180 0.977300 
PCGASREV ~0.153350 0.050010 -3.066000 
PCRESALE ~0.270120 0.048620 -5.555000 
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The over~ll md,del predicts average cost of each kWh sold very well with an R2 
of0.88. Also, th~ estimated coefficients had in all cases the expected sign. The DSM 
parameter estim~te of:-.003, had expected negative sign indicating that as DSM's share 
oftotal expenditures rose the cost of electricity production went down. The parameter 
estimate is unfortunat(~ly not statistically different from zero. However, as a point 
estimate the paq:1mete1r is the best available indicator of the impact ofDSM and as such 
predicts a only a, very minor decrease in average costs. A one-point increase in DSM's 
share of total expenditures was predicted to reduce average cost by three thousandth of 
one percent. Ev~n ifQSM expenditures became quite substantial the absolute impact · 
on the average c;osts c~fproduction would be quite smal134 . 
That DSM exj?enditure impacts on average cost were negative rather than 
positive offered some support for the argument DSM investments are least-cost 
alternatives to ~upply·,~side investments. From the demand equation estimated above, 
DSM investments res.ulted in reductions in quantity demanded. All other things being 
equal, a reduction in demand would be associated with a increase in average cost and 
not a decrease. It seems that in spite of the DSM induced reductions in demand that 
would tend to increase average costs, DSM expenditures were concurrently associated 
with reduction~ in av,erage costs. 
34 DSM expenqiture~ averaged 1.4% of total annual expenditures. This was the 
equivalent of$1.8 billion (1990$) that was associated with a 0.003% reduction in cost 
or the equivalent of \lpproximately $6 million (1990$). 
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The regression results are actually supportive ofDSM since DSM impacts on 
cost appeared to be negative or in the worst case negligible. This indicated that utilities 
could use DSM as a customer service or as a tool to support market growth or market 
retention without great concern that it will lead to increases in cost and rate increases. 
Three variables that describe the output levels of a utility were included in the 
model as explanatory variables. The total quantity sold to final consumers, weighted by 
the number of residential customers, QUANTITY, was -0.3 and had the expected 
negative sign indicating that as quantity sold increased the average cost per kWh 
decreased. A ten percent increase in quantity demanded was associated with a decrease 
in price of about 3%. It was assumed that the average residential demand, RESKWH, 
would also be negatively correlated since many ofthe costs of transmission and 
distribution and administration are associated with the residential customer class. This 
variable proved to be highly significant and did not have problems of multicollinearity 
with the variable, QUANTITY. The estimated coefficient indicated that a ten percent 
increase in residential demand would cause a 2% decrease in average cost. The other 
electricity output variable was, PCRESALE, which was the percent of total electricity 
sold that was sold on the wholesale market. A negative relationship was assumed since 
wholesale power sales will make use of excess generating capacity and reduce average 
costs and also many of the costs associated with selling to the final consumers are not 
present. The parameter estimate of -0.27 indicated that a three point increase in resales 
was associated with close to a 1% decrease in average cost. 
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Inputs into the production of electricity were also included in the cost model. 
Capital is represented by, INVKWH, the ratio of total plant ilnvestment to electricity 
generated and pu~chased. The parameter estimate of0.12, had a positive sign indicating 
that when the capital input per kWh went up by one point the average costs went up by 
a bit more than one-tenth of that. Fuel costs, FUELKWH wtere entered in the equation 
as the average dollar cost of fuel per megawatt hour generated. The estimated 
coefficient was 0.36 indicating that a 10% incre~se in fuel prices would be associated 
with an increase in electricity prices of3.6%. With a parameter estimate of0.023 for 
WAGES, the changes in the average cost of labor (wages, pension, and benefits), had 
little impact on average cost. If labor costs incr~ased by 10% average costs would only 
be expected to increase by 0.24%. 
The sources of electricity were also foupd to affect the average cost. Utilities 
that generated all of the electricity demanded appeared to have lower costs of 
electricity production than those that purchaseCI some portion of the electricity sold. 
The parameter estimate for purchased power, PCPURCH, t:>f0.31 indicated that is 
power purchases increased their share of total power sold l:ly ten points, the associated 
increase in average costs was 3.1%.35 One of the reasons for this higher price for 
purchased power may be due to a short-run purchases that 1have a premium price 
associated with them. Another reason is that p~rchased po'fVer will already have profit 
embedded in its cost. The share of total electric;ity generated by nuclear power was 
35 There may be some question as to the direction of the causal relationship if utilities 
with higher power costs are more prone to pm·chasing power to reduce their costs. 
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expected to increase costs. The estimated parameter for the variable PCNUKE was 
0.004 and indicated that nuclear power was positively correlated with the average cost. 
The impact of nuclear power appeared to be quite small since regression predicted a 
0.4% increase in average cost if 100% of the electricity were generated at nuclear 
power plants. 
Financial and operating characteristics ofutilities also influenced the average 
cost of electricity. Taxes as share of total expenditures, PCTAX, with an estimated 
coefficient of0.004 was positively associated with cost. The total impact was quite 
small since a one-point increase in taxes' share was predicted to cause a four 
thousandths of a percent increase in average cost. New construction had a potentially 
large impact the average cost since the variable PCCWIP, the ratio ofCWIP to total 
plant investment, had a parameter estimate of0.24. CWIP represents presently 
unproductive capital investments which add to the cost of operations. These costs can 
be from a variety of sources such as increased debt payments36, and inclusion ofCWIP 
costs in the general costs. The regression results estimated that a utility where CWIP 
represented 4% ofthe total electric plant average costs would increase by 1%. 
Negative relationships with average cost are estimated for the age of plant, 
PLANT 
36Long-tenn debt payments will increase to finance construction costs and short term 
debt payments may increase due to cash-flow problems that result from cash-flow 
problems from incurring the long-term debt. 
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(-0.18), and dual fuel utilities, PCGASREV. The regression results for the variable 
PLANT, indicated that utilities with older plants have lower costs. This could be due to 
a variety of factors. The most probable reason for this negative impact was that capital 
investments of older plants had a greater percentage of their value amortized and the 
capital investments in the plant no longer entered into the rate base resulting in lower 
costs. The presence of older plant possibly was also an indication of better operations 
and maintenance procedures that allow the utility to operate plant longer than other 
utilities. Putting off the plant retirement in tum allows the utility to put of construction 
in replacement plants and thus reduce costs. Increased plant age could also indicate that 
the utility optimized the running of the plants in such a way that load factor is increased 
again pushing investment in new construction into the future and reducing overall 
capital costs. Another factor was that older plant may be actually cheaper to run than 
newer facilities. Older plants may have been grandfathered the right to bum certain 
cheaper fuels, such as higher sulfur coal, or were not required to comply with certain 
environmental protection requirements. 
Dual fuel utilities also appeared to have a cost advantage over those that supply 
only electricity. The variable, PCGASREV, was the percent of total utility revenue is 
the result of gas operations and had a parameter estimate of -0.15. The estimated 
equation predicted that a utility that obtained 10% of its revenue came from gas 
operations would have average electricity costs that were 1.5% lower than a utility that 
obtained 100% of its revenue from electricity sales. This should be expected since gas 
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and electric operations will share many costs thus lowering overall average costs to 
both electric and gas services. An area where high savings can be expected is the 
administration, where billing and meter reading can be combined, and many 
administrative tasks overlap. 
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IV.6. Simultaneous Estimation of Demand and Cost 
Discussed earlier was the possibility that cost and quantity are both 
simultaneously determined. Due to the simultaneous nature of the quantity, average 
cost and price the assumption that the dependent variables are fixed in repeated sample 
is violated. This causes the OLS estimators to be biased. To correct for possible bias 
the following set of simultaneous equations were estimated: 
Cost = j (DSM, Quantity Financial, Managerial, Operating, Regulatory) 
Quantity = k (DSM, Price, Fuel, Customer, Weather) 
Price = r (Cost, Return on Investment) 
Where the first two equations are described in the cost equation and demand equation 
sections above. The third equation was described previously as an equality 37 that 
connected the cost and demand equations together. It was however, specified as an 
equation above because the demand being modeled is the demand of final consumers, 
the price that is entering the equation is the average price that they are faced with while 
the average cost of kWh sold applies to kWh sold to final consumers and kWh resold 
to other utilities. The costs associated with kWh sold to final consumers and kWh sold 
to the wholesale market could not be separated. Average sales to other utilities 
37 P, • Quantity = Cost+ Return on Investment 
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comprised an average of 17% of utility sales during the analysis period. Costs 
associated with these sales were therefore quite substantial and had to be taken into 
account when estimating the average costs. The price equation was included in the 
model to connect the average cost and demand equations. 
A specification test developed by Hausman (Hausman, 1978) is one method to 
detect the presence ofsimultaneity.38 The Hausman test was performed on each ofthe 
equations. In respect to the tests performed on the cost and quantity equations the 
residuals that were entered into the test equations had parameter estimates that were 
statistically different from zero, while the cost residual entered into the price equation 
was not statistically significant.39 The tests indicated that average price was 
simultaneous with quantity and quantity was simultaneous with average cost.40 
To correct for simultaneity a variety of methods have been developed. The 
method used below is the full information maximum likelihood method (FllvfL). It 
38 The test relies on the fact that the endogenous terms are correlated with the error 
terms. It is a two stage procedure. The first stage estimates the reduced form equations 
for the price, quantity and cost variables. The residuals ofthese regressions are then 
entered into the appropriate single equation and the equations are estimated 
individually. Evidence of simultaneity results in estimation statistically significant 
coefficients for the residuals. 
39 For the quantity equation the price residual had at statistic of 4.8. For the cost 
equation the quantity variable had at statistic of2.2. In the price equation the cost 
residual had at statistic of 0.16. 
40 A likelihood ratio test was also performed by calculating the test statistic 
-2*(LR -LtJR). LR is the log-likelihood ofthe restricted model and LUR is the log-
likelihood of the unrestricted model. The statistic is distributed in a chi squared with 
degrees offreedom equal to the number of restrictions. This was calculated as -2(763-
(136+304+323))=54. Since the chi squared distribution at 1% significance level and 
with 2 degrees of freedom is 9.21 the likelihood ratio test indicated that that there were 
statistically significant differences between the restricted and unrestricted model. 
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should also be noted when estimating systems of equations simultaneously the 
parameters become more sensitive to specification error. 41 This is because specification 
error in one equation can now affect the parameter estimates of all equations. The three 
equations were then estimated simultaneously, after specifying PRICE, COST and 
QUANTITY as endogenous variables. The results of the regression are shown on 
Table IV.l2. 
41 Pindyck and Rubenfeld, 1991. 
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Table IV.12 
Price and Quantity Model Full Infonnation Maximum Likelihood 
(Demand R2 = 0.71, Cost R2 = 0.86, Price R2 =0.89log-likelihood = 736) 
Variable Parameter Asymptotic Asymptotic 
Estimate Standard Error "T' Ratio 
DEMAND 
INTERCEPT -4.589499 1.11818 -4.10 
Y91 -0.031724 0.02277 -1.39 
Y92 0.066024 0.02649 2.49 
Y93 -0.00226246 0:02807 -0.08 
PRICE -0.529159 0.06433 -8.23 
PC INC 0.528366 0.11011 4.80 
PCDSM -0.028933 0.0084108 -3.44 
PCPAPER 2.571696 1.11153 2.31 
PCP.METAL 5.285998 1.46055 3.62 
PCMFG 0.953801 0.36484 2.61 
COOLDD 0.225914 0.02837 7.96 
GAS -0.155696 0.06865 -2.27 
DENSITY -0.041138 0.01295 -3.18 
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Table IV.l2 (Continued) 
Price and Quantity Model Full Infonnation Maximum Likelihood 
(Demand R2 = 0.71, Cost R2 = 0.86, Price R2 =0.89) 
Variable Parameter Asymptotic Asymptotic 
Estimate Standard Error "T' Ratio 
COST 
INTERCEPT -1.967013 0.30372 -6.48 
QUANTITY -0.457192 0.06365 -7.18 
PCPURCH 0.247021 0.04702 5.25 
PCDSM -0.010453 0.0050595 -2.07 
INVKWH 0.126946 0.02958 4.29 
PCNUKE 0.00373310 0.0004410 8.46 
FUEL KWH 0.324953 0.02070 15.70 
PCTAX 0.00288132 0.0012720 2.27 
PCCWIP 0.237657 0.12637 1.88 
PLANT -0.145528 0.02440 -5.96 
RES KWH -0.157962 0.03501 -4.51 
WAGES 0.017129 0.01811 0.95 
PCGASREV -0.072485 0.05163 -1.40 
PCRESALE -0.078066 0.08416 -0.93 
PRICE 
INTERCEPT 0.345067 0.08436 4.09 
COST 0.886778 0.02233 39.72 
ROI42 0.090960 0.01224 7.43 
~2 Average income per kWh sold. 
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In general the results of the FIML were similar to those that were estimated for 
the equations separately. Given that FIML method simultaneously estimated the set of 
equations and corrects for bias introduced due to simultaneity, the results of the FIML 
estimation were the preferred results. The signs and the relative magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients were for the most part the same. Discussion of the FIML results 
therefore primarily targeted those estimates where the results differed significantly. 
In the demand equation the impact ofDSM expenditures, PCDSM, is still as 
weak as before with a parameter estimate of -0.03. The estimated price and income 
elasticities, respectively -.053, and 0.52, changed slightly though were still within the 
ranges found in earlier studies. One parameter value that changed significantly was the 
price of gas, GAS. The cross-price elasticity of gas was estimated at -0.15 that was 
negative and statistically different from zero. This coefficient indicated that an increase 
in the price of natural gas would bring about a decrease in demand for electricity. This 
result is not reasonable since a rise in price of a competing fuel should be associated 
with a reduction in the demand for electricity. 
The cost equation did not have any variables that changed the direction of their 
impact. The most significant change was that the estimated PCDSM coefficient, -.01, 
became statistically significant and had increased its impact by a factor of three. The 
impact was still extremely small relative to the total spending on DSM and average cost 
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of producing electricity.43 Two other variables that had their changed parameter 
estimates with the FIML estimation were the dual fuel utility variable, PCGASREV, 
and the utility's wholesale activity variable, PCRESALE. The dual fuel utility 
coefficient, -0.07, was no longer statistically different from zero and the actual impact 
on average cost was much smaller. With the new coefficient a utility that obtained 10% 
of its revenues from gas would only experience a 0.7% reduction in the average cost of 
electricity compared to the 1.6% reduction measured in the single equation regression. 
The large reductions to average costs that had been associated greater levels of 
wholesale activity were also no longer estimated with the simultaneous model. The 
estimated coefficient for the share of resales was -0.08 compared to the -0.27 estimated 
in the single equation regression and was not statistically different from zeros. This 
indicated that increased bulk power sales did not lead to substantial decreases in 
average costs. Possibly bulk power sales are made at the short-run marginal cost and 
primarily cover only variable and not fixed costs. 
The price equation performed quite well as was expected. Average costs and 
average income were assumed to be the primary components of the average price paid 
by retail customers. The parameter estimate of average cost, COST, was 0.89 and 
highly significant indicating that every one percent increase in cost led to a 0.89% 
increase in rate. The return on income parameter, ROI, was 0.09 and indicated that a 
43 Even increasing the associated reduction in average cost savings by a factor of 3 
would only result in average total annual cost savings of approximately S 18 million 
( 1990$) compared to $1.8 billion (1990$) in average annual total DSM spending for 
the sample (see footnote 30). 
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1% increase in the investment income led to a 0.1% increase in price paid by final 
consumers. 
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V. Conclusion 
The results of this study indicated that it was possible to measure the DSM 
system level impacts. During the period analyzed DSM investments constituted a large 
enough share oftotal expenditures and investments of investor owned utilities as to 
allow their impacts to be measurable. If future DSM spending on programs continues at 
its present rate, this type of an evaluation can be useful in providing national DSM 
impacts. Even with immanent industry restructuring, there are a sufficient number of 
plausible scenarios that include continued spending on DSM. 
The estimated DSM investment model indicated that the utility's regulatory 
environment had a major impact on the variances in DSM investment. An above 
average regulatory climate and least-cost planning requirements were found to have 
large impacts on the level ofDSM investment. As a favorable regulatory climate was 
associated with higher DSM spending, it was reasonable to assume that profit 
incentives, such as increases in the rates of return, allowing DSM investments into the 
rate base, or allowing utilities to recoup lost revenues were a PUC's methods for 
promoting DSM. The argument that PUC profit incentives promoted DSM investments 
was bolstered by the rate of return being positively correlated with DSM investments. 
Higher rates of return may have been due to the PUC profit incentives. 
Another important regulatory factor proved to be PUC-mandated least-cost 
planning requirements. Utilities must consider DSM as a viable alternative to supply-
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side electricity generation to meet future electricity demand when using least-cost 
planning. In theory, this should allow DSM resources to be placed on a level play:ing 
field with supply-side resources. Forcing a utility to consider DSM in its resource 
planning raises the probability that DSM will be included in the mix of utility resource 
investments. 
Some indications exist that capacity-constrained utilities inves~ed more in1DSM 
than did others. The model also indicated that power purchases were possibly 
substituted with DSM resources. Higher incomes and greater resident.ial consumption 
of electricity were also associated with increased DSM spending. The positive 
relationship with income could indicate that the income elasticity for ~he demand for 
DSM is such that demand for DSM services rises with income. Great~r DSM 
investments also occurred when average residential electricity consumption is higher. 
With greater electricity consumption, customers may have a greater d.emand for 1 
services to reduce energy expenditures that will increase demand for PSM programs. 
Also greater consumption will increase the average customer energy ~;avings potential 
that will also increase the ability for a utility to offer cost-effective to DSM services. 
The estimated DSM investment model explained 40% of the variance in IDSM 
expenditures. Many other variables were entered into the equation, bl,Jt were not found 
to be correlated with DSM expenditures. However, many of these variables, sudt as 
those used to represent capacity constraints, may have been too general. FurtherJ using 
only dummy variables to describe the regulatory environment grossly simplifies tlhe 
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relationships between the utilities and one or more PUCs. A model using more detailed 
information !ihould improve the estimation. The estimated model indicates areas, such 
as the regulatory environment and utility capacity requirements, where more research 
may be usefi.ll. 
The direction ofDSM impacts on average costs and quantities demanded were 
not unexpected. A negative correlation between DSM investments and quantity 
actually provided "negawatt" cost estimates, that under certain assumptions were in the 
vicinity of actual prices of electricity. However, estimated reductions in demand were 
only a fraction of the reported expected energy savings. 
It is possible that the demand equation regression underestimated the impact of 
DSM investments. DSM programs have spillover effects into other utilities' service 
territories. DSM program participants may move the energy-efficient equipment 
sponsored through the program into the service territories of other utilities. Utility 
programs that bring about market transformations also have a spillover effects as it is 
not only the market in their service territory that is being transformed. Many DSM 
programs also result in 111et load growth. By targeting load retention, utilities investing 
in DSM prevent reducti1ons in quantity demanded relative to utilities that do not pursue 
such a strat,egy. TherefQre, the reported energy savings will be masked when energy 
savings are associated with new and retained loads. 
The estimated average cost equation did verify that DSM's impacts on average 
costs was nelatively small and negative. To put this impact in perspective it should be 
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considered that short-run average cost impacts of energy conservation programs 
resulting in lost sales give an upward push to average costs. Even with these reductions 
in demand, DSM impacts on average costs were negative. This indicates that, on 
average over the four-year period, DSM has tended to reduce costs relative to utilities 
not instituting DSM programs. It is possible that even within the this study's time 
frame, DSM has deferred capacity and thereby lowered capital costs. 
The estimated cost of equity capital equation results were quite surprising. 
Initially, DSM's theorized impact on the M/B ratio was without an expected sign and 
potentially could not have been correlated with the utilities' stock prices. DSM 
expenditures were found to have a positive, statistically significant, and substantial 
impact on the cost of equity capital. The model predicted that spending 5% oftotal 
expenditures on DSM would be associated with a 10 point increase in the MfB ratio. 
This represents an utility stock valuation, approximately 7% greater than that predicted 
if the utility had not made DSM investments. Part ofthis increase could be due to DSM 
deferring investments in capacity, as utilities with older plant and equipment, and less 
current new construction were also associated with higher stock prices. Part ofDSM's 
impact may also be due to its acting as a proxy for other factors, such as improved 
customer relations and services or better operations and maintenance procedures, 
which should be associated with higher stock prices. 
The DSM investment model indicated that a large factor influencing DSM 
spending levels was the regulatory environment. As the industry restructures and 
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becomes more competitive, less regulatory involvement could mean reductions in DSM 
investments. The demand, cost, and equity capital models all indicate that utilities may 
continue offering DSM services after the industry's restructuring. DSM investments 
were not associated with large reductions in demand, which is an anathema for utilities. 
DSM was also associated with decreases, not increases, in average costs. IfDSM 
programs were really not cost-effective by not deferring expensive capacity and 
purchasing "negawatts" at inflated prices, an increase in electricity costs should have 
been measured. 
The cost of capital equation produced results that present DSM's future in a 
favorable light. DSM spending is associated with reduced capital costs. Thus, DSM 
investments may continue after the electric industry restructures because these 
investments can decrease the cost of equity capital. As the market places a premium on 
DSM investments during regulation, this favorable valuation of DSM may remain after 
the industry restructures. 
It appears that regulator "driven" DSM constitutes a large part ofDSM 
investment. If regulators and other interested parties do not wish DSM to decline after 
the industry restructures, provisions for DSM funding must be made, either through 
line charges, taxes, or other forms of funding. The findings also have implications for 
DSM practitioners in that the large and possibly excessive savings attributed to DSM 
are not in evidence. These savings may have been masked by programs that expand 
demand or retain loads. These types of programs will increase net demand regardless of 
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how energy-efficient the new and re:tained load is. Savings from energy efficiency 
should not be equated with reductions in total load. 
The study shows that utiliti~ investing in DSM may be following an 
appropriate corporate strategy that 1rewards its shareholders. The estimated demand 
equation did not predi•~ large revenue losses whilt~ the average: cost equation 
associated DSM inves~ments with ~ small decreas'e in average costs. Given these small 
impacts DSM has on ~1oth electricity cost and elec:tricity demand, DSM investments 
could be pursued as a method to in~rease stock prices. In the future, DSM services may 
be used as a way to di.fferentiate one utility from its competitOJrs. 
The years 1990 through 1993 were the years used for this analysis. However, 
the future ofDSM is no longer what it was then. Industry widle restructuring is seen by 
many as the death kn~U of utility fi1r1anced DSM. Retail wheeli1r1g will e11able customers 
to choose and change electricity s~rvice providem. Without captive customers electric 
utilities will have no QlCentive to invest in demand-side programs. These DSM 
investments will be at risk if a customer were to c:hange electriicity providers. This does 
not mean that DSM sl!rvices will n~ot be offered by utilities. If utilities were to charge 
the customer receivin~ the DSM services directly for this service DSM would be less 
risky. Retail-level cornpetition may in fact put ele:ctricity servi•:e providers under 
greater pressure to pmvide quality DSM services that customers are willing to pay for. 
Retail wheelir1g will bring about greater price competi1tion between energy 
service providers. TNs will eventUally cause the Jprofit margin in selling electricity to 
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narrow. Energy services that include DSM will be used by utilities to compete for 
customers and to dev~lop areas business with greater profitability. Retail wheeling may 
also cause the consuJrJwr to chang\C their patterns of energy use ifTOU pricing is 
adopted. The consuml'!r will obtain the correct price signal from which to determine 
their consumption. These signals (may induce the consumer to invest in energy efficient 
appliances, energy elfflcient homes or home improvements, or obtain DSM services 
from the energy provider. 
Another possible scenariO! that includes DSM programs is a continuation and 
expansion of federal ~d state go•,vernment funded DSM programs. PUCs could. 
mandate or provide ir1centives fotr local distribution companies to provide DSM 
services if these sen~~es are not offered by actual electricity service providers. Such 
programs could be financed using a transmission charge.« 
From the mo~lels estimated in this analysis, it seems inevitable that factors 
influencing DSM invt;stment patterns will change in the future. Industry restructuring 
will include deregulation, tendin~~ to reduce DSM spending, since regulatory factors 
were found to influcmce investm(tnts in DSM. However, DSM was not found to induce 
large revenue losses pr increase costs. These results, combined with the finding that 
DSM spending may ~ncrease stoiCk prices, indicates that utility DSM spending will 
probably continue in some form or another in the deregulated future. 
-------------·-~. -----
.._. Line charges, billte~ as "distribl:ution benefits charges", are promoted to fund energy 
efficiency, renewabl~ energy so~rces and assistance to low-income customers. They 
exist in 3 states and life being pr1oposed in 8 others (E News, January/February 1996, 
pp. 2). 
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VI. Future Research 
This study reveals several important areas offurther nesearch. One ofthe.se is , 
the impact ofDSM on utility investments on new capacity investments. DSM 
investments were made, in part, to defer investments in the e<mstruction 1additior'al 
electric plant. Investigations into actual impacts would be of interest for plannin¥ 
further DSM investments. Separating DSM's impacts on cap1:tcity between generating 1 
capacity and transmission and distribution facilities would also be ofuse.1 This type of 1 
analysis can only be conducted at the utility level, as this is where decisions to a1id 
capacity are made. In most cases, DSM investments will not defer load in the year the: 
investments are incurred, rather in some later year. When additional year1s of 
consumption, investment, and expenditures are available, res1earch on DSM' s impacts 
1 
on deferred capacity can be undertaken. 
Estimating DSM investment impacts at the customer class level would a.llow for 
better specification of demand equations. DSM impacts may also vary depending on 1 
the customer class. Disaggregating DSM investments to the level where1 specifi<; types 
of expenditures can be groups will enable the impacts of conservation and load 
management programs to be measured separately. This will remove some of th~ 
ambiguity in the expected direction ofDSM impacts, as conservation pr:ograms are 
expected to reduce demand, while load management programs will primarily sh.ift 
electricity demand to another period. 
1115 
DSM interactions with national and local legislation on energy efficiency remain 
to be measured. The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act 1987 and the New 
Energy Act of 1992 should have substantial impacts on energy consumption over time. 
How DSM programs change in the wake of industry restructuring remains another rich 
area for future research. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
Variables Used to Estimate Model 
Variable Variable Description 
Name 
Financial and 
Managerial 
ROR Rate of return on investment 
PCTAX. Taxes as a percentage oftotal expenditures. Sum 
of total local, state, federal, and other taxes 
divided by total electric utility expenditures. 
PCCWIP CWIP as a percent of total electric plant 
investment. Total CWIP divided by total electric 
plant. 
WAGES Average utility wage. The sum of total wages, 
benefits, and pensions divided sum offull-time 
employees and half of the part-time employees. 
PCGASREV Total gas operation revenues as a percent of 
total utility revenues. Total gas revenue divided 
by total utility revenue. 
DIVIDEND Dividend pay-out ratio 
EQDBRAT The equity-debt ratio. The mean of end of year 
and beginning ofyear total proprietary capital 
minus the mean value of end of year and 
beginning ofyear preferred stock divided by end 
ofyear and beginning of year long term debt. 
-
Source 
Value Line 
FERCForm 1 
FERC Form 1 
FERC Form 1 
FERC Form 1 
Value Line 
FERC Form 1 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Name 
MBRATIO Market-to-book ratio, the market share price Value Line 
divided by the book value per share. Annual 
earning per share multiplied by the average 
annual price earning ration divided by the book 
value per share. 
Operational 
PCIND Percentage of total sales to industrial customers. FERCForm 1 
Total MWh sold to industrial customers divided 
by total MWh sold to final consumers and for 
resale. 
PCDSM DSM percentage share oftotal expenditures. EIA Form 861 
Total DSM expenditures divided by total electric and FERC 
company operating expenses. Form 1 
PRICE Average price of eiectricity. Total revenues from FERC Form 1 
final consumers divided by the total kWh sales to 
final consumers. 
PCPURCH Percent of total power (purchased and FERC Form 1 
generated) that was purchased. Total power 
purchased divided by sum of total power 
purchased and generated. 
LOAD The annual load factor (ratio of average load Value Line 
divided by peak load) 
COOLDD Annual cooling degree-days. BLS 
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Variable I Variable Description Source 
Name 
DENSITY Polle miles per residential customer. Total pole FERCForm 1 
milc~s divided by the total residential customers. 
Av2illable for 1990 and 1991. Value from 1991 
used for .1992 and 1993. 
QUANTITY Total quantity electricity sold to final consumers FERC Form 1 
divided by number of residential customers 
INVKWH Investment in plant per kWh generated or FERC Form 1 
purc::hased. Total electric plant divided by total 
kWh sold to final consumers and for resale. 
PCNUKE Percent of generated and purchased power that FERC Form 1 
is gt~nerated by nuclear power plants. Total 
electricity generated through electric power 
divided by sum oftotal generated and purchased. 
FUEL KWH Fuel costs per kWh generated. Total fuel costs FERC Form 1 
divided by kWh generated. 
PLANT Average age of utility plant by holding company. Value Ljne 
PCRESALE Total electricity resales as a percent of total FERC Fprm 1 
electricity sold to final consumers and for resale. 
Customer I 
PC INC Per capita income by state and year. BEAREIS 
RES KWH Average MWh consumption per residential FERC Fprm 1 
customer. Total MWh sold to residential 
customers divided by number of residential 
customer. 
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Variable Variable Description Source 
Name 
GAS Price of natural gas by state and year. Gas Facts 
Yearbook 
PCMFG Manufacturing as a percentage oftotal BEAREIS 
employment by state and year. 
PCPAPER Percentage of all employment income from the BEAREIS 
pulp and paper industry by state and year. 
PCPlVIETAL Percentage of all employment income from the BEAREIS 
primary metal by state and year .. 
Reguiatory 
LCUP Dummy variable indicating least-cost planning Mitchell 
required within the firm's service territory by (1989, 1992) 
state for 1989 and 1992. 
1 =Required 
0 =Not required 
REGOOD Dummy Variable indicating the regulatory Value Line 
environment is rated above average by state and 
year. 
1 = Above average 
0 =Average or below average 
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Data :Sources 
1. Fin:ancial Statistics oflnvestor-Owned Electric Utilities (1989-1993). 
Data on electric utility financial and operating variables, contained on FERC 
Fonn I, were obtained from the EIA. This included a total of900 variables or 
approximately 45% of the data contained on the fonn. Practically all of the 
data contained in the annual EIA publication, Financial Statistics of Selected 
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, for the years 1989-1993 was included in 
this database. Included in this data were the distribution of hydropower, 
nuclear, steam, and other power generation, fuel costs, total costs of power 
purchases and sales, residential, commercial, and industrial consumption, 
revenue by type of customer class, electricity sold by customer class, labor 
costs, construction work in progress (CWIP), taxes paid, environmental 
protection investment and costs, and rate of return. 
4. Value Line {1988-1994) 
Electric utility financial characteristics such as book value per share, dividend 
pay-out percentage, percentage of AFUDC in profits, rate of return, price 
earning ratio, average earnings, regulatory environment, plant age, load factor, 
capacity, merger activity. 
~l. Moody's Public Utilities ( 1985). 
Electric utility merger activity, ownership percentages, and bond ratings. 
4. EIA Form 861 (1990-1993) 
This data provided information on annual DSM expenditures and expected 
savings. The distribution of sales by state was also available for the year 1993. 
The 1993 distribution was used to represent that of the previous three years. 
5. R(~gional Economic Information System (1989-1993) 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis maintains this database which is available 
on the Internet. This database contains wage and employment data at the state 
level for the year 1969 through 1993. Employment and wage data is available 
at the two digit SIC code level. 
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6. Upited States Oommerce Department Web Site 
Regional annual temperature data was obtained from the Commerce 
Department Web Site. This was for each of the 9 regions and had annual data. 
An averag~~ was used for 1993. 
7. Gf1S Facts Yearlbook (1989-1993}, American Gas Association 
Gas prices by state. 
8. Bureau ofLabor Statistics Web Site 
Producer ailld regional CPis and Weather data were obtained from this Web 
site. 
9. Mitchell (1989,11992) and Chamberlin, Fry. and Braithwait (1988) 
Least-cost planning by state. 
10. ~-lousing Characteristics 1990, Energy Information Agency (1992) 
Electric heat penetration rate. 
11. Statistical Yea:rbook of the Electric Utility Industry, ,(annu~). Edison Electric 
Institute I 
Total electric sales by state. 
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Appendix Q: A Definition of Demand-Side Management 
DSM ranges over a large set of policies and programs and has not been 
perfectly defined. The se~ of strategies pursued through these programs is shown on 
Figure 1. In general DSM can be separated into two major categories; load-
management and conservation. These are discussed separately below. 
Load-management 
The typical electric utililty does not generate a constant amount of electricity. 
Demand varies by time of day ~o time of year (Figure 2, 3, and 4). Most utilities in the 
south are summer peaking due 1to cooling demands while areas such as the Pacific 
Northwest are winter p~g due to large heating loads. Utilities must by law meet 
demand and for this reaspn wiUI have excess generating capacity and an under used 
distribution and transmis~ion system so as to be able to meet the peak demands on the 
system. As a peak perio~ progtesses more and more ofthe available capacity is used. 
The additional power thEj.t is g~nerated is more costly since less efficient plant and 
equipment will be brought into1 use. Due to the practice of average cost pricing the 
consumer does not obtai.n the c:orrect price signal, which is the marginal cost of 
production. Therefore at peak periods customers are paying below marginal costs and 
during off-peak periods the price is above the actual marginal cost. 
Large difference~ between peak and off-peak periods will generally lead to 
higher than needed rates due t<O the excess capacity. Thus it will be in the utility's and 
consumers' favor to shi~ the demand for electricity that occur during the peak period 
into that of the off-peak or reduce it completely. Load-management is commonly 
separated into three stra~egies:1 peak clipping, valley filling, and load shifting, where a 
flexible load program is ll subs~t of peak clipping. Another strategy is strategic load 
growth. The latter can include1both conservation and load-management (Gellings and 
Talukdar, 1986). Utility spons,ored programs which have been developed to induce 
these types of shifts in d~mandl behavior are varied and many have only seen limited 
use. The load-managem~nt strategies can be separated into five different types of 
programs: 
1. Time of use (TOU:~ rates (seasonal rates, time of day, coincident demand, 
demand charges). 1 
2. Direct load ~.ontrot 
3. Control of q.~stomer appliances. 
4. Energy stor&ge. 
5. Fuel switchi~1g. 
TOU rates, in effect, are treating electricity demanded over a daily period and 
over seasonal periods 3.$ diffe~ent products for which a different price is charged in 
each period due to differences: in generation, distribution, and transmission costs. In 
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PE.AK CLIPPIN?· or the re<juction of the system ~ak toads. embodie~ 
one of lhe ~l.USIC lorm:; of load ma011gemenL Peak dipping is gen-
erally conSJdef"ed as lhe redudion of peak load by using direc11oad 
co.n_trof. Oirec11oad control is most commonly pr.~dkcd by direct -c 
ullhly control of customers' appliances.. While many utilities consider ~ 
!his IU a means to reduce peaking cap.acity or=~ pur~es and --' 
consider control ooly during lhe most probable days of system peak.. 
dir·ect t.o:ad CQ('Illo( can be used to r~uce oper.ating c:o.st and depend-
ence on critical fuels by economtc: dispatch. 
V ti1Ll.EY AWHG is the second du.sic form of load lllaiQgement.. 
Valley filling enc:ompuses building otf-pe2k lo3cls. This m::ay be 
particularfy desir:~bte where the long-nm ~tat cost is tess than 
thee average price of electricity. Adding property priced off-peak load 
under those c:in:umst:ances decreases the average price. Vattey filling 
ca'n be accompfr.shed in sevem wa-p.. one ot the most popular of 
which is new thermal energy storage (water ~ting and/or space 
heating) that cfu.places lo:ads served by fo:uil fuels.. 
LCIAO SHIFTING is the last clas..sic1onn of load management. This 
in"olves shifting load froro on-peak to oil-peak periods. Popular 
applications include use of storage water heating. SIOfCige space 
heating, coolness storage. and customer load shills.. In t11is case. the 
load sllil! from storage devices involves di~placing what would have 
been conventional appliance~ served by elee1rici!y. 
ST:RA IEGIC CONSERVATION is the load shape change thai results 
fro1m utility-stimulated programs direc1ed at end use consumption. Not 
nonnally considered load management the change reflects<! modi-
fication o! the load shape involv;ng a reduction in sale~ as well as a 
cl'lange in tile pallern of use.. In employing energy conservation. tl'le ~ 
utility planner must consider what conservation <!Ctions would occur S 
naturally and then evaluate the cost~llectiveness of possible intended 
utility programs to accelerate or stimulate those actions. El:.amples 
include weatherization and appliance efficiency improvemen:.. 
ST'R:.. TEGIC LOAD GROWTH is the load shape c!'lang~ tl1at refers to a 
general increase in sales beyond-the valley filling described previ-
ously. load growth may invol~ inaeased market share of loads that 
ane. or can be. served by competing fuels. as well as are01 de .. el-
opmenL In ltle future. load growth may indude electrification. 
El1~c:rific<!tion is the term currently b~ing employed lo'Ciescribe tile -g 
ne w emerging electric technologies surrounding electric vehicles. .3 
in<jus:rial process heating. and automation. These have a potential for 
in<:re:asing the elec1ric energy intensity oftne U.S. industrial sector. 
I his rise in intensity may be motivated by reduction in the use of foss[l 
fut~ls ·and raw materials resulting in impro-.ed overall productivity. 
FLEXIBLE LOAD SHAPE is a COflcepl related to reliability, a planning 
constraint Once the anticipated load shape. including demand-side 
activilies. is forecast over ttle corporate planning horizon. the power 
supply planner studies the final optimum supply-side options. Among 
lh1e many criteria he uses is reliability. Load shape can be flexible - if 
customerS' are presented with options as to the variations in quality of 
service that they are willing to allow in e.:cllange for various incen- ~ 
lives. The programs involved can be variatio~ of interruptible or cur- 0 
tailable load: concepts of pooled. integrated energy management --' 
systems: or individual customer loa<;~ control devices oflering service 
constraints.. 
Figure 1 
Demand-Side Management Strategies 
(Gellings and Chamberlin, 1988) 
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theory TOU rates would be more efficient rates to charge since they would better 
reflect the marginal cost of the electricity demanded. In practice they have seen only 
limited use in the United States while in France and later in England their use has 
become more widespread. 
In the United States the rate structure prior to the 1980's was one in which 
declining block rates were prevalent. Increasing block rates and TOU rates were 
viewed as ways to constrict the demand for electricity, which would not have been in 
the utility's interest. Prior to the eighties, typical utility strategy to meet future demand 
had been the construction of more generation. The passing of the Public Utilities 
Regulation and Policy Act of 1978 encouraged the implementation of decreasing 
block and TOU rates, mainly in the form of a seasonal rate structure. There has been 
limited experiments in TOU pricing for most customer dasses but actual 
implementation of such rates has only been used for selected larger industrial 
customers. At present metering costs for smaller customers have not been conducive 
to adopting utility-wide TOU pricing. One could predict with the lowering of cost of 
automatic metering devices, through either the projected fiber optic networks or small 
radio controlled meters, that real time pricing will become a reality by the end of the 
decade. This event would reduce the need for utility DSM programs since consumers 
would be obtaining the correct price signals and then be able to adjust their 
consumption accordingly. 
Demand charges have been in use since the creation of the electric industry in 
the United States Their implementation is a two part tariff, usually referred to as the 
Hopkinson electricity tariff, where actual consumption of kWh and maximum 
instantaneous demand in kW are priced separately. Demand charges are based on the 
instantaneous demand in kW and have the desired effect of reflecting marginal costs 
associated with capacity usage. This is under the assumption the customer peak 
demand is coincident with system 'peak demand (Bonbright et al, 1988). At present 
demand charges apply mainly to industrial customers and to larger commercial users. 
Their peak kW demand is calculated either actual measurements of the customer 
demand or using customer dass averages. 
The additional four load-management program types have only seen limited 
use, though in many areas they should prove to be a cost effective alternative to 
additional generation. Direct load control applies mainly to industrial clients who have 
facilities to generate their own electricity. A peak clipping strategy that is employed is 
to contract with large customers the right not to supply them with electricity during 
the peak period. By offering them lower electric rates in exchange for lowering the 
quality of service utilities can achieve these service curtailments. These interruptable 
rates would be set through a bargaining process to be less than the normal rate, 
though how much less would depend on the lead time needed to notify the customer 
of service interruption, the total number of hours interruptions are allowable, and 
other factors. In a survey ofutilities in 1985 over 75% of the sampled utilities had 
interruptible rates (Cogan and Williams, 1987). In theory programs allowing 
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customers to buy power at a lower th~ normal reliability could be extended to the 
commercial and residential classes but as yet little has been done in this area. 
Some programs result in the u~ility hiaving direct control of customer 
appliances such as air conditioning sy~tems,1hot water heaters, or boilers. Again 
customers are offered power at n low,r ratel in exchange for losing some control over 
their appliances. In many cases the prQgrams are designed not to interfere greatly with 
the workings of the appliances. In the case of hot water heaters homes are targeted in 
which little hot water is used during tl1e day! The water heater is turned off by the 
utility during peak periods and then ~rned back on before the client returns home. 
With air-conditioning units the utility would1 use its control to let only a certain 
fraction of the units under its control cycle on for the same fraction of an hour. This 
would not necessarily reduce total corlSumption of electricity, but would remove the 
possibility of aU units cycling on at the same time; causing s micro-peak. Also, in the 
case of a potential black or brown out the appliances under direct control could be 
turned offreducing this potential problem. By 1990 these types of programs have 
been planned to increase the number c,fcontrolled appliances from the estimated 2.5 
million in 1985 to a total of7 million t'Limaye and Rabl, 1988). 
DSM energy storage can be thought! of as storing heat or cold at the place of 
usage and not being related to pumpCI;i storage. In the case of heating, heat is 
generated during an off-peak period ~d st<j>red in a solid storage such as bricks or a 
boiler. During the peak hours this stor·ed energy is used to heat or produce hot water. 
In the case of cooling, ice or cooled water are created in the off-peak period and used 
to cool a facility during the peak periqd. ObMously more electricity is consumed using 
this type of alternative and decreased rates must be used to encourage the installation 
of such facilities. 
Fuel switching is generally not, a preferred alternative to many utilities. In the 
case of an all electric utility, electric ~es will suffer if customers switch from 
electricity to gas, oil or biomass. Where the1electric reduction will only appear at peak 
periods a fuel switching program could be a1 cost effective alternative to supplying 
electricity from peaking facilities or h~ving to add additional capacity. Some utilities 
have instituted programs which foster use of dual fuel appliances where electricity is 
the primary fuel and the secondary fu~l is only used during peak periods. A possible 
problem that could arise from having custoriners switch from electricity to gas, is that 
gas supply problems could be created or aggravated. 
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Conservation 
Two program types which do not fall into the category of load-management 
are: 
1. Conservation 
2. Efficient Load Growth 
When added demand on the system is forecast, a utility should be indifferent 
between adding new generation and instituting conservation programs which would 
make the added demand unnecessary if they are granted an equal return on their 
investment. This would oo true if prices were allowed to change reflecting the loss in 
revenue resulting from the reduction in sales brought on by conservation programs. 
At present most such programs are looked upon as variable costs. Only slowly are 
PUCs allowing for conservation investments to go into the rate base and 
recompensing the utilities for their revenue shortfall. In the advent of retail wheeling 
investments in such programs will become more problematic since many of these 
investments will be viewed as stranded costs. These DSM investments are typically 
owned by the customer and not the utility. With customers being able to switch 
service providers, any investments made for this customer will not benefit the 
sponsoring utility. 
Existing conservation programs have targeted most customer classes and have 
a variable amount of direct utility involvement in conservation activities. The least 
direct involvement is the use of advertising by the utility to promote conservation and 
provide conservation information to consumers. A more direct form of utility 
promotion is the provision of utility sponsored energy audits with a varying degree of 
utility subsidization. Further programs offer installation of energy reducing features 
either through reduced interest loans or utility sponsored energy efficient appliance 
rebates. Another variant is buying electricity consumption reductions due to 
conservation activities from customers directly or from firms which provide 
conservation measures to customers. Other programs involve different types ofutility 
and industry partnerships where incentives are paid to dealers to promote and stock 
items, manufacturers to design and produce efficientf'smart" appliances/equipment, 
or construct buildings that are energy efficient or "smart". 
Recently the market transformation has become the goal of many utilities 
programs. Programs with the goal of transforming the market seek to make 
fundamental changes in the demand for energy efficiency services and energy efficient 
products. Successful programs can be phased out without causing the demand for the 
programs products and services to disappear. These programs are geared to change 
the buying habits of consumers, the stocking practices of dealers, and the product 
development and design practices of manufacturers. Programs such as these have 
made compact fluorescent light bulbs, high efficiency heat pumps and gas furnaces, 
motors, and appliances more available. It is only after the markets for these products 
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have b~n developed and consumer acceptance is high that government legislation of 
efficiency standards becomes possible. This in tum makes the program impacts 
perm~1ent. A clear example ofthls was the development ofthe energy efficient 
building cod€:s that are now in plaCe in Oregon and Washington. Utility programs that 
sponsqred changes in building practices transformed the residential new construction 
marke~ in suc:h a way that code changes could be passed without great resistance from 
the ho1ne building industry. 
Stratc~gic load growth can fall into both conservation and load shaping 
strategies. This strategy targets energy use in new or renovated buildings and 
facilitie,es, the replacement of old appliances, and new markets involving electro-
technologies. Programs encouraging energy efficient designs and the placement of 
energy effici€mt appliances by architects, construction companies, appliance dealers 
and ~ufae1turers, and contractors can fall into this category and can culminate in 
reduced futu1re energy use and the targeting load impacts of new or changed demands. 
Often limes the goal of these programs is to reduce fuel switching and retain market 
share i;n certaun lucrative areas or to develop a toehold in potential new markets. 
Many peatpump and water heater programs are geared to retain market share of an 
important pa:rt of a utilities load. Air conditioner programs are often times used to 
boost the penetration rate of not only energy efficient air conditioners but the air 
condit~oners in general. 
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Appendix ill: Hypothesis T~ts 
DSM Investment Equation 
1. Regression with 8 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (24 variables), and different intercepts for each year (4 variables). 
ESS = 402 N ~ 324 
2. Regression with 8 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (24 variables), and one intercept. 
ESS = 408 N = 324 
3. Regression with 8 explanatory variables and different intercepts for each year ( 4 
variables). 
ESS = 420 N = 324 
4. Regression with 8 explanatory variables one intercept. 
ESS = 437 N = 324 
F statistic 
1. Regression 4 tested against Regression 1 0.92 
2. Regression 4 tested against Regression 2 0.85 
3. Regression 4 tested against Regression 3 3.89 
Cost of Equity Capital Equation 
1. Regression with 1 0 explanatory variables, interaction terms for each of the three 
years (30 variables), and different intercepts for each year (4 variables). 
ESS = 87,426 N = 324 
2. Regression with 10 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (30 variables), and one intercept. 
ESS = 87,763 N = 324 
3. Regression with 10 explanatory variables and different intercepts for each year (4 
variables). 
ESS = 96,874 N = 324 
4. Regression with 10 explanatory variables one intercept. 
ESS = 140,729 N = 324 
F statistic 
I. Regression 4 tested against Regression 1 5.17 
2. Regression 4 tested against Regression 2 5.63 
3. Regression 4 tested against Regression 3 42.3 
4. Regression 3 tested against Regression 1 1. 0 1 
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Demand for Electricity Equation 
1. Regression with 9 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (27 variables), and different intercepts for each year (4 variables). 
ESS = 7.9 N = 324 
2. Regression with 9 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (27 variables), and one intercept. 
ESS = 7.91 N = 324 
3. Regression with 9 explanatory variables and different intercepts for each year ( 4 
variables). 
ESS = 8.16 N = 324 
4. Regression with 9 explanatory variables one intercept. 
ESS = 8.48 N = 324 
F statistic 
1. Regression 4 tested against Regression 1 0.70 
2. Regression 4 tested against Regression 2 0. 75 
3. Regression 4 tested against Regression 3 3. 71 
Average Cost of Electricity Equation 
1. Regression with 13 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (39 variables), and different intercepts for each year (4 variables) 
ESS = 2.614 N = 324 
2. Regression with 13 explanatory variables, interaction tenns for each of the three 
years (39 variables), and one intercepts 
ESS = 2.622 N = 324 
3. Regression with 13 explanatory variables and different intercepts for each year (4 
variables) 
ESS = 2.875 N = 324 
4. Regression with 13 explanatory variables one intercept 
ESS = 2.90 N = 324 
F statistic 
1. Regression 4 tested against Regression 1 0.70 
2. Regression 4 tested against Regression 2 0.73 
3. Regression 4 tested against Regression 3 0.75 
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